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INTRODUCTION
o'HE 1980's are a propitious time to expand first amendment freedom
X for the electronic media. Mark Fowler, the recent Chairman of the
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") often
emphasized that, as nearly as possible, the print media should be the
regulatory model for the electronic media.' Under Commissioner
Fowler, the FCC has had remarkable success in carrying out a deregu-
latory program toward this goal.2 The Supreme Court recently advanced
this movement by suggesting that it may be time to reexamine the funda-
mental premise for much of broadcast regulation: the perceived scarcity
of the electromagnetic spectrum.' Contemporaneously, the VCC
1. See, e.g., Fowler and Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation,
60 Tex. L. Rev. 207, 209 (1982) ("the perception of broadcasters as community trustees
should be replaced by a view of broadcasters as market-place participants"); Deregula-
tion's Architect Finds the Structure Sturdy, Broadcasting, Dec. 23, 1985, at 44, 52 ("I'd
want to see the First Amendment firmly in the saddle in broadcasting. That means no
government content control, period.") (interview with Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC);
The Bittersweet Chairmanship of Mark S. Fowler, Broadcasting, Feb. 18, 1985, at 39, 41
(regulatory relationship between FCC and broadcast media "should be the same as the
print people enjoy") (interview with Mark S. Fowler). Mr. Fowler has resigned, effective
in spring, 1987, and is to be succeeded by Commissioner Dennis Patrick, who generally
shares Mr. Fowler's views. See Broadcasting, Feb. 9, 1987, at 43-44; Stuart, A Cautious
Deregulator, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1987, at 13, col. 5.
2. See, e.g., Revision of Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98
F.C.C.2d 1076, 1115-16 (1984) (rep. & ord.) (deregulating commercial television), recon-
sid. denied, 104 F.C.C.2d 357 (1986); Revision of Requirements of Pub. Broadcasting
Licensees, 98 F.C.C.2d 746, 757 (1984) (rep. & ord.) (eliminating ascertainment require-
ments and relaxing program logging requirements for public broadcasting); Children's
Television Programming and Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 657 (1984) (rep. &
ord.) (refusing to adopt new regulation of children's programming), affd per curiam sub
nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Policy
Concerning Educ. Broadcast Stations, 86 F.C.C.2d 141, 160-61 (1981) (2d rep. & ord.)
(decreasing Commission's intervention in programming decisions of public broadcasters
by modifying rules pertaining to promotional programming and "on-the-air" fund-rais-
ing), reconsid. denied, clarification and deregulatory ruling granted, 90 F.C.C.2d 895
(1982); Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 971, 1014 (rep. & ord.) (eliminating
certain guidelines and requirements "to permit the discipline of the marketplace to play a
more prominent role"), reconsid. granted in part, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), affid in part,
remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983), on remand, 96 F.C.C.2d 930 (1984), reconsid. denied, 57
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 93 (1984), vacated and remanded, 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
on remand, 104 F.C.C.2d 505 (1986); Revision of Application for Renewal of Radio and
Television Licenses, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 740 (rep. & ord.) (simplifying procedures
for license renewals applicable to all television and radio broadcast stations), reconsid.
denied, 87 F.C.C.2d 1127 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC
719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). See generally The
Fowler Years: A Chairman Who Marched to His Own Drummer, Broadcasting, Mar. 23,
1987, at 51-52.
3. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n. 11 (1984).
Comprehensive government regulation of broadcasting has been justified by the per-
ceived, inherent, physical limit to the available broadcast frequencies at least since the
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), created the Federal Radio Commission.
See, e.g., Statement on Public Interest, Convenience, or Necessity, 2 FRC Ann. Rep. 166,
168, 170 (1928) (citing "the paucity of channels," the "limited facilities for broadcast-
ing," and the fact that the "number of persons desiring to broadcast is far greater than
can be accommodated" to justify regulation under the public interest standard). Justice
Frankfurter's expansive and much criticized opinion for the Supreme Court in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), first gave priority to the rationale
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launched a formal inquiry4 into the continuing viability of the fairness
doctrine, one of the most inhibiting features of the remaining regulation. 5
over first amendment concerns. In Frankfurter's words, "[t]he facilities of radio are lim-
ited and therefore precious; they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to the
public interest." See id. at 216. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), a more modem Court reaffirmed this approach, and in a number of subsequent
cases the Court continued to rely on the scarcity rationale. See id. at 388. See, eg.,
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-97 (1981); FCC v. National Citi-
zens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795, 799-800 (1978). In FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court again restated the scarcity rationale in its
review of the "fundamental principles that guide our evaluation of broadcast regulation."
Ia. at 376. The Court, however, then noted increasing criticism of the scarcity rationale
and suggested that it might be time to reconsider that "longstanding approach." Id. at
376 n.11. Cf. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501,
508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The basic difficulty in this entire area is that the line drawn be-
tween the print media and the broadcast media, resting as it does on the physical scarcity
of the latter, is a distinction without a difference. Employing the scarcity concept as an
analytic tool.., inevitably leads to strained reasoning and artificial results.") (Bork, J.
joined by Judge, now Justice, Scalia), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Feb.
20, 1987) (No. 86-1370). See generally Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part I: Why
Can't Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 Md. L. Rev. 212, 218-40 (1987).
4. See Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (1984); Fairness Doctrine
Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985), petition for review dismissed in part per curiam, Radio-
Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (review denied
only as to constitutional challenge) (a rehearing has been granted); Syracuse Peace Coun-
cil v. Television Station WTVH, 52 Fed. Reg. 2805 (1987) (requesting comment, in light
of the 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, on whether enforcement of fairness doctrine is
constitutional and contrary to the public interest); see also FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12 (1984).
Although in the Fairness Doctrine Report the Commission deferred to Congress to
alter or repeal the fairness doctrine, the Commission strongly assailed it as constitution-
ally suspect, unnecessary, and no longer serving the public interest because it chills and
coerces speech. See Fairness Doctrine Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 147-48 (1985). The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, in an opinion joined by Judge,
now Justice, Scalia, recently lessened the Commission's need to defer to Congress by
finding the doctrine to be "an administrative construction, not a binding statutory direc-
tive." Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), reh'g en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), petition for cert filed, 55
U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1987) (No. 86-1370). See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d
863 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring FCC to consider constitutional challenges to the doctrine,
unless the Commission decides not to enforce the doctrine because it is contrary to the
public interest). But see House Conference Rep. No. 1005 on H.J.R. 738, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec. H10,599, H10,619 (1986) (requiring FCC to consider
alternative means of administering and enforcing the fairness doctrine and to report to
Congress before changing the doctrine); Jt. Strut. of Comm. Conf. on HJ.R. 738, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec. H10,709, 10,720 (1986) (same). In response
to this statutory directive, the Commission has issued a Notice of Inquiry to solicit public
comment regarding alternatives to the fairness doctrine. Alternatives to the Fairness
Doctrine, 2 F.C.C. Red. 1532 (1987).
5. The FCC's fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to devote a reasonable percent-
age of broadcast time to the coverage of public issues and provide an opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting points of view. See Fairness Doctrine Report, 48 F.C.C.2d I,
7 (1974), reconside denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff'd in part sub nonm. National Citi-
zens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 436
U.S. 926 (1978), on remand, Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 74 F.C.C.2d 163 (1979) (rep. &
ord.), reconsid. denied, 89 F.C.C.2d 916 (1982).
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In the cable television area, the Commission, 6 soon supported by the
Supreme Court,7 maintained that much state and local regulation of
cable is federally preempted, thereby substantially deregulating that in-
dustry. Congress, in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
("1984 Cable Act"),' codified much of the preemption and deregulation.
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
unconstitutional the FCC's "must-carry" rules, which required cable sys-
tems to carry local broadcast signals.9 Requirements that cable operators
provide access to their systems 10 are increasingly subject to attack on first
amendment and other grounds."1 More generally, the Ninth Circuit has
questioned the constitutionality of several elements of the basic cable
franchising scheme under the 1984 Cable Act.12
As encouraging as these deregulatory trends are, broadcasting will
achieve its due first amendment status only when the law no longer treats
the broadcast spectrum as a peculiarly unique and scarce resource sub-
ject to greater regulation than other media. Changing this perception of
6. See Cox Cable New Orleans, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.C.C.2d 717
(1984) (reaffirming Commission's preemption of regulations concerning cable operator's
retiering of service offerings); Community Cable TV, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1204, 1218 (1983)
(extending federal preemption of cable television system rate regulation to specialized or
auxiliary cable services), reconsid, denied, 98 F.C.C.2d 1180 (1984).
7. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700-01 (1984) (affirming the
FCC's "unambiguously expressed... intent to pre-empt any state or local regulation...
of signals carried by cable television systems").
8. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59 (Supp. III 1985)), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News (98 Stat.) 2779.
9. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986). For many years, the must-carry rules required cable sys-
tems to carry all local and other "significantly viewed" broadcast signals. See 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.51-76.67 (1985). See generally C. Ferris, F. Lloyd, & T. Casey, Cable Television
Law, %1 7.04-7.09 (discussing history of must-carry rules). The FCC, however, acqui-
esced in and, indeed, praised the Quincy decision, see statement of Chairman Fowler and
Comm'rs Dawson and Patrick, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1005 (1985), but the National
Association of Broadcasters sought Supreme Court review. Under pressure from Con-
gress, however, and after a compromise between major cable and broadcast interests, the
Commission has reimposed a less burdensome form of must carry. See Must Carry
Rules, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 792 (1986), modified on reconsid., 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
(1987). These new rules base broadcast carriage requirements on the channel capac-
ity of the cable system.
10. See infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 987 (D.R.I.
1983) (mandatory access regulations do not violate first amendment), certified question
answered, 488 A.2d 676 (R.I.), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
12. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1410-11 (9th
Cir. 1985), afl'd on narrower grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986); see also Century Fed., Inc.
v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1478-79 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (following Preferred
Communications granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on a first amendment
challenge to a municipality's exclusive franchising arrangement for a cable operator); cf
Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th Cir.
1986) (rejecting first amendment challenge to a de facto exclusive franchising scheme for
cable operators in part because cable television market is a natural monopoly), cert. de-
nied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1987) (No. 86-1159).
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the broadcast spectrum may depend, in turn, on the advent of compara-
ble, competing modes of communication, such as cable television and
other entrants in the new electronic video marketplace,13 that are not
saddled with the historical error of scarcity as a rationale for regulation.
Consequently, if broadcast and cable are perceived as fungible, scarcity,
if it ever was a legitimate rationale, will be a thing of the past and so
ought to be much of the regulation based on it. At the same time, com-
petition from the essentially substitutable broadcast medium should pre-
clude regulation of cable based on its alleged monopoly position.
For these reasons, I have argued in a companion Article that cable and
broadcast television should be viewed as a single, unified medium."4 In
that Article, I show that judicial opinions that afford cable more freedom
from regulation than broadcasting, by ostensibly distinguishing the two
media, actually support their similarity. Consequently, there is no reason
to apply either to cable or to broadcasting different first amendment stan-
dards than to the print media. The unified cable/broadcasting approach
I advocate therefore encourages a vital symbiotic relationship between
the two media in which each medium supports for the other full first
amendment freedom from a broad range of actual and potential
regulation.
The cable indecency cases, however, are sui generis in this regard and
pose a potential impediment to this goal. In these cases, advocates of
greater first amendment freedom for the video marketplace have scram-
bled to distinguish cable from broadcasting to avoid the reach of FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,"5 the 1978 "seven dirty words" decision allowing
censorship of vulgar language on radio. 6 Because the Pacifica rationale
for controlling broadcast indecency is generally thought, somewhat in-
13. This Article focuses on one facet of the electronic communications market,
namely the comparison between cable and broadcast television in the delivery of audio/
video programming. See 47 U.S.C. § 522 (5), (11), (16) (Supp. III 1985) (defining "cable
service," "other programming service," and "video programming" in the 1984 Cable
Act).
14. See Winer, supra note 3.
15. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). For a discussion of Pacifica, see infra Part I.B.3.
16. For a discussion of the cable indecency cases taking this approach, see infra Part
II.A. For commentary that generally supports such a distinction, see Geller & Lampert,
Cable Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32 Cath. U.L. Rev. 603 (1983);
Hofbauer, "Cableporn" and the First Amendment: Perspectives on Content Regulation of
Cable Television, 35 Fed. Comm. L.J. 139 (1983); Krattenmaker & Esterow, Censoring
Indecent Cable Programs The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 Fordham L Rev.
606 (1983); McFadden, Inviting the Pig to the Parlor: The Case Against the Regulation of
Indecency and Obscenity on Cable Television, 8 Colum. J. Art & L. 317 (1984); Robbins,
Indecency on Cable Television-A Barren Battleground for Regulation of Programming
Content, 15 St. Mary's L.J. 417 (1984); Note, Obscenity, Cable Television and the First
Amendment Will FCC Regulation Impair the Marketplace of Ideas?, 21 Duq. L Rev.
965 (1983); Note, Indecent Programming on Cable Television and the First Amendment,
51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 254 (1983); Note, Regulation of Indecent Television Programming:
HBO v. Wilkinson, 9 J. Contemp. L. 207 (1983). For arguments that Pacifica should be
applicable to cable to allow some measure of indecency control, see Riggs, Indecency on
the Cable Can It Be Regulated?, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 269 (1984); Wardell, Cable Comes of
19871
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correctly, not to rely on spectrum scarcity,17 the cable indecency cases
rest on distinctions other than scarcity. Based on these distinctions,
courts to date have, for the most part, correctly forestalled censorship
but often for the wrong reasons. This Article concludes that distinguish-
ing cable from broadcast television in the indecency context is wrong,
outmoded, and unnecessary. More important, it is antithetical to the de-
veloping symbiotic relationship between cable and broadcasting and,
therefore, detrimental to maximizing first amendment freedom for the
electronic media.
Part I of this Article surveys generally the development of content reg-
ulation in broadcasting and, specifically, control over indecent program-
ming, culminating in Pacifica. It shows that Pacifica is unsupportable
and technologically outdated. Censoring anything except legal obscenity,
therefore, should be improper in both cable and broadcasting. Part II
examines the distinctions between cable and broadcasting asserted in the
case law to exclude cable from indecency regulation. Part III demon-
strates that these asserted distinctions are unconvincing and inimical to
the broader goal of viewing cable and broadcasting as fungible to afford
each the same first amendment status as the print media. The approach
of the cable indecency cases, therefore, should be abandoned.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTENT CONTROL IN BROADCAST
REGULATION
Censorship of George Carlin's radio monologue at issue in Pacifica
would be unthinkable in most other nonbroadcast media.'" To under-
stand, then, why there even was an issue over the radio broadcast re-
quires examination of the statutory, regulatory, and judicial background
of general content control in broadcasting, particularly as to indecent or
offensive programming.
A. The Early Development of General Content Control
Congress has long shown concern for broadcasters' freedom of ex-
presssion. Section 29 of the 1927 Radio Act specifically precluded gov-
ernment censorship of radio communication.' 9 Moreover, the Federal
Age: A Constitutional Analysis of the Regulation of "Indecent" Cable Television Program-
ming, 63 Den. U.L. Rev. 621 (1986).
17. See infra note 197.
18. See infra notes 65-107 and accompanying text. Indeed, no party contended that
the Carlin monologue was obscene. Moreover, the Court in Pacifica used the lawful
availability of the monologue in other media, such as records and nightclub perform-
ances, to support its decision because, it reasoned, banning the radio broadcast would be
far from total censorship. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731, 750 n.28.
(1978).
19. Radio Act of 1927 Ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162, 1172, repealed by, Communica-
tions Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102. Section 29, however, prohibited
the utterance on radio of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language." See id. at 1173.
See infra note 118. Section 29 became § 326 of the 1934 Communications Act, and the
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Radio Commision ("FRC"), established by the Act, ostensibly eschewed
any censorship role. Nevertheless, the Commission quickly assumed the
general power to control radio program content through an application
of the Act's central regulatory standard, the "public interest, conven-
ience, or necessity."'2 In an early exercise of this power, the FRC an-
nounced that its main interest in evaluating competing license
applications was to insure that "the program service of broadcasting sta-
tions is good, i.e., in accordance with the standard of public interest, con-
venience or necessity."2 This meant that "the tastes, needs, and desires
of all substantial groups among the listening public should be met, in
some fair proportion, by a well-rounded program."''- In this regard, the
Commission clearly considered the interests of the public as listeners to
prevail over those of broadcasters as speakers.
In addition to this general policy, the FRC soon reacted against what
it perceived as specific broadcaster abuses. Although most early major
networks and stations were quite formal and conservative,' 3 a number of
eccentric broadcasters engaged in excesses. 24 Two early cases that up-
held the FRC's right not to renew a license because of program content
deemed inconsistent with the public interest standard set the precedent
for control of broadcast indecency. 5
In KFKB Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. FRC,26 plaintiff radio sta-
tion was controlled by Dr. Brinkley, who had formed an association of
druggists to dispense numbered prescriptions prepared according to the
legislative history of a 1948 amendment to § 326, see Codification of Title 18 of the
United States Code, ch. 645, § 1464, 62 Stat. 683, 769 (1948), emphasized the "hands-off"
restriction on the Commission: "[S]ection 326... makes clear that the Commission has
absolutely no power of censorship over radio communications and that it cannot impose
any regulation or condition which would interfere with the right of free speech by radio."
See S. Rep. No. 1567, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948) (emphasis added).
20. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 4, 4(f), 9, 11, & 21, 44 Stat 1162, 1163-64, 1166,
1170. See Winer, supra note 3, at 217 n.17 (discussing this standard).
21. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC, 3 FRC Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), modified
on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cerL dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
22. Id. at 34. It soon became clear, however, that "all" did not include programming
considered offensive to many.
23. See S. Head & C. Sterling, Broadcasting in America 145 (4th ed. 1982). In 1934,
for example, CBS declined to carry a speech by the United States Surgeon General that
would have alluded to venereal disease. Id.
24. Id. at 146. Moreover, when the National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") was
so bold as to broadcast certain dialogue in a Mae West comedy routine, the FCC re-
minded NBC of the proper standards of taste and propriety. Id. at 145. In the late
1930's, the FCC also expressed its disapproval of other subject matter, such as astrology,
contraceptive advertising, horse race information broadcast in code, fraudulent products,
and misleading personal advice. See C. Sterling & J. Kittross, Stay Tuned: A Concise
History of American Broadcasting 189 (1978).
25. See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text. In an earlier case, the first appeal
of a Commission decision denying a license renewal based in part on the licensee's pro-
gram service, the court simply assumed that the Commission could consider program
service in evaluating a licensee's performance under the public interest standard. See
Technical Radio Lab. v. FRC, 36 F.2d 111, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
26. 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
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doctor's formulas. Dr. Brinkley broadcast a regular question-and-answer
period in which he would respond to listeners' letters, make a diagnosis,
and prescribe by number one of his medications, for which he received a
fee from the dispensing druggist.27
Upon challenge to the FRC's denial of KFKB's license renewal appli-
cation, the court held that the limited number of available broadcast fre-
quencies allowed the FRC to consider "the character and quality of the
service to be rendered," as measured by a station's past conduct.28 In
fact, because the Commission considered past conduct, albeit to deny an
opportunity for future broadcasting, the court found there was no at-
tempt at prior restraint. Consequently, finding no censorship in violation
of section 29, the court had little difficulty sustaining the FRC's
decision.29
A more troublesome case, dealing with allegedly defamatory and ob-
jectionable language, was decided the next year. In Trinity Methodist
Church v. FRC,30 a church owned a Los Angeles radio station that was
operated by its minister, Dr. Schuler. The minister's broadcasts attacked
other religions and sought to influence the outcome of pending court
cases. For the latter activity Dr. Schuler had already been cited for con-
tempt of court. Because of these activities the FRC denied the station's
license renewal application. 3 The station's appeal squarely presented to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia a first amendment
challenge to the FRC's authority to regulate offensive programming,
without the issue of improper practice of medicine that had complicated
KFKB.
Although the court paid homage to first amendment freedoms with
reference to Milton's Areopagitica and other works,32 the only case cited
in support of such freedom33 was the Supreme Court's recent prior re-
straint case, Near v. Minnesota.34 In Near, the Supreme Court struck
down a state statute allowing the "abatement, as a public nuisance, of a
'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper.' ,3 The Trinity
Methodist court, however, followed the dissent in Near, which did not
view the nuisance abatement statute as a prior restraint because it did not
authorize previous administrative control of what was printed.36 In the
Near dissent's view, abatement only punished improper past publication,
which was an "abuse of the right of free press."37 Similarly, the court in
27. See id. at 671.
28. Id. at 672.
29. See id.
30. 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
31. See id. at 850-52.
32. See id. at 851.
33. See id.
34. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
35. See id. at 701-02, 722-23.
36. See id. at 735 (Butler, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
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Trinity Methodist, citing KFKB, ruled that first amendment freedom of
expression
does not mean that the government, through agencies established by
Congress, may not refuse a renewal of license to one who has abused it
to broadcast defamatory and untrue matter. In that case there is not a
denial of the freedom of speech, but merely the application of the regu-
latory power of Congress in a field within the scope of its legislative
authority.38
This is clearly contrary to the majority opinion in Near. The Near
Court recognized that the effect of the abatement statute was not just
subsequent punishment for an offensive publication, like a suit for libel.
Rather, the statute proscribed any future publication, the same effect as
nonrenewal of a radio license. The Near Court thus found that the stat-
ute, in operation and effect, was "the essence of censorship," and there-
fore invalid.39
Consequently, although Dr. Schuler might have been liable for defa-
mation, contempt of court, or similar punishment for his broadcasts, the
Near opinion made clear that he should not have been denied a license
renewal because of past offensive programming. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case,' and waited for ten years,
until National Broadcasting Co. v. United States41 to consider the first
amendment's restriction on government regulation of broadcasting.
In the meantime, from its inception under the Communications Act of
1934,42 the Federal Communications Commission, as successor to the
FRC, continued the policy of controlling the content of radio program-
38. Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1932). Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) had been decided the previous year but after the decision
in KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). There was no
reason for the court of appeals in Trinity Methodist to follow KFKB instead of the major-
ity in Near.
39. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 722-23 (1931).
40. See Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). The court of ap-
peals' failure to follow the Near majority, and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Trinity Methodist are ultimately inexplicable. But see infra note 190. If the courts per-
ceived a difference between the print media and radio broadcasting, justifying the applica-
tion of different first amendment standards to each, they did so sub silentio. Except for a
passing reference in Trinity Methodist to "limited facilities" as a justification for the
FRC's role in controlling program content notwithstanding the first amendment, see
Trinity Methodist, 62 F.2d at 852, there is no principled or reasoned discussion of the
distinctions between the two media that could lead to contrary conclusions. Perhaps,
however, the distinction lay in the unchallenged licensing system itself, which was ac-
cepted for radio, yet anathema for the press. Trinity Methodist, however, failed to distin-
guish proper consequences of licensing, such as technical regulations to reduce
interference and to maintain a system of broadcasting, from impermissible forays into the
realm of censorship. By the time of National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943), it may have been too late for the Court to rethink this fundamental approach.
41. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). For a discussion of this case, see Winer, supra note 3, at
220-27.
42. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982
& Supp. III 1985)).
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ming.43 The Commission, through its licensing power, informally co-
erced stations to keep their programming in line." Indeed, this coercive
power may have persuaded broadcasters, as an industry, to regulate their
own programming. In 1929, the National Association of Broadcasters
("NAB") promulgated a Code of Ethics proscribing the broadcast of any
material that "would commonly be regarded as offensive" or that could
be banned from the mails as fraudulent, deceptive or obscene.45 Until
very recently, the NAB promulgated radio and television codes specify-
ing standards of acceptable behavior for its members."
In 1939, the FCC tried to set general standards by listing fourteen
kinds of program material or practices that it considered not to be in the
public interest.47 A few years later, in 1946, the FCC followed with the
"Blue Book,"48 a comprehensive statement of FCC programming policy
that also defended the authority for and propriety of judging the quality
of licensee programming. This analysis was based on the legislative his-
tory of the 1927 and 1934 Acts, the administrative practice under these
Acts and the decisions in KFKB, Trinity Methodist, and National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States.49 The Blue Book then enumerated four ma-
jor issues involved in the application of the public interest standard to
program service policy. 0
The FCC's Programming Policy Statement of 1960,"1 which updated
43. See generally C. Sterling & J. Kitross, supra note 20, at 189 (like the FRC, "the
FCC . . . could decide whether a station's policies and programs were in the public
interest").
44. See id. Between 1934 and 1941, for example, the Commission had to revoke only
two licenses, and it failed to renew only eight. Id.
45. NAB Code of Ethics (1929), reprinted in Documents of American Broadcasting
70 (F. Kahn 4th ed. 1984).
46. The NAB Code was eliminated as a result of a consent decree concluding a gov-
ernment antitrust action against the NAB. See United States v. National Ass'n of Broad-
casters, 553 F.Supp. 621, 626 (D.D.C. 1982).
47. The fourteen categories were:
(1) defamation, (2) racial or religious intolerance, (3) fortune-telling or similar
programs, (4) favorable reference to hard liquor, (5) obscenity, (6) programs
depicting torture, (7) excessive suspense on children's programs, (8) excessive
playing of recorded music to fill air time, (9) obvious solicitation of funds,
(10) lengthy and frequent advertisement, (11) interruption of "artistic pro-
grams" by advertising, (12) false, or fraudulent or otherwise misleading adver-
tising, (13) presentation of only one side of a controversial issue-an early
statement of the Fairness Doctrine and, (14) refusal to give equal treatment to
both sides in a controversial discussion.
C. Sterling & J. Kitross, supra note 24, at 189 (citation omitted).
48. FCC, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946). This was
dubbed the "Blue Book" because of the color of its cover.
49. Id at 9-12.
50. See id. at 12-47. The issues were: (1) the carrying of sustaining (i.e. non-spon-
sored) programs to supplement standard commercial fare; (2) the carrying of local live
programs; (3) the carrying of discussions of public issues; and (4) the elimination of com-
mercial advertising excesses. Id. at 12-47.
51. 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960) (en banc), affid sub nom. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
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this approach, accorded more deference to the first amendment and the
anticensorship provision of the 1934 Act. Citing Supreme Court deci-
sions confirming first amendment protection for films, the Commission
ostensibly disavowed any role in matters of taste or in deciding whether a
program is good or bad-apart from obscenity, profanity, and inde-
cency. z Nonetheless, the FCC listed fourteen "major elements usually
necessary to meet the public interest" standard for service of a station's
local community. 3
There are numerous other FCC rules, policies, and actions that im-
pinge significantly on the content of broadcast programming and, there-
fore, raise their own first amendment considerations. The fairness
doctrine and related rules governing political or electoral broadcasts'
comprise probably the most significant and important of these. In addi-
tion, broadcasters' programming freedom is limited in various categories
such as cigarette55 and liquor56 advertisement; drug-related song lyrics";
52. See id. 44 F.C.C. at 2306-10.
53. Id. at 2314. These included:
(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local
talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational pro-
grams, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political
broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (10) news programs, (11) weather and
market reports, (12) sports programs, (13) service to minority groups, and
(14) entertainment programs.
Id. at 2314.
The Commission, however, specifically referred to this list as "neither all-embracing
nor constant." Id. The Commission repealed these categories for radio in 1981. See
Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 971 (rep. & ord.) reconsid. granted in part, 87
F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), affid in part, remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communication
of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
54. See supra note 5. For a discussion of the doctrine and related rules, see Winer,
supra note 3, at 268-78.
55. At one time, the FCC applied the fairness doctrine to commercial advertising,
and thereby required presentation of the dangers of smoking to counteract cigarette ad-
vertising. See WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), affid sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). After trying unsuccessfully
to limit the application of the fairness doctrine to the smoking controversy, see Friends of
the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C.Cir. 1971) (requiring FCC to apply fairness
doctrine to automobile and gasoline advertising based on its application to cigarette ad-
vertising), the FCC reversed its policy and excluded most commercial advertising from
the ambit of the fairness doctrine. See Fairness Doctrine Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 22-28
(1974). The exceptions were "editorial advertisements" that do not merely sell products
but present a "meaningful statement which obviously addresses, and advocates a point of
view on, a controversial issue of public importance." Id. at 22-23. This new policy was
sustained. See Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (Ist Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
Congress, however, entered the cigarette controversy in 1969 by making cigarette ad-
vertising illegal on "any medium of electronic communication" subject to FCC jurisdic-
tion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-42 (1982 & Supp. III
1985) (regulating cigarette labeling and advertising). The ban was upheld in Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), at a time when
commercial speech, particularly in the form of advertising, was given little or no first
amendment protection. See, eg., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (mu-
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nicipal ordinance forbidding distribution of commercial handbills in the streets is consti-
tutional). It has been argued that the ban on cigarette advertising has become
unconstitutional in light of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) and its progeny, which extend considerable constitu-
tional protection to commercial speech. See Wuliger, The Constitutional Rights of Puff-
ery: Commercial Speech and the Cigarette Broadcast Advertising Ban, 36 Fed. Comm. L.J.
1, 2 (1984). But see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968,
2979-80 (1986) (in upholding statute and regulations restricting advertising of casino
gambling the Court suggested that ban on advertising of harmful products, such as ciga-
rettes, would not violate first amendment because products themselves may be regulated).
56. Whether regulation of liquor advertising in broadcasting or cable is consistent
with the first amendment is still somewhat unsettled, despite substantial protection of
commercial speech. Broadcasters and cable operators challenged an Oklahoma prohibi-
tion on television advertising of wine and alcoholic beverages other than beer. See
Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 492-93 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub
nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984). The ban excluded media
printed outside Oklahoma, but sold or distributed in state. See id. at 493 n. 1. The Tenth
Circuit upheld the ban, in part, because the previous year the Supreme Court had sum-
marily dismissed a case with substantially identical merits. See id. at 497 (relying onQueensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 459 U.S. 807 (1982) (dismissing by
memorandum for want of substantial federal question).
Only the cablecasters and not the broadcasters petitioned for certiorari. See Capital
Cities, 467 U.S. at 696-97. The Supreme Court reversed, relying on federal preemption of
cablecasting regulation without reaching the first amendment issue. See id. at 715-16.
One week later, the Court continued to avoid this issue by declining to review a Fifth
Circuit upholding a Mississippi law prohibiting the advertising of alcoholic beverages.
See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1259 (1984). An Oklahoma district court, however, recently found that the
Oklahoma ban on advertising violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment by discriminating between in-state and out-of-state advertisers. See
Oklahoma Broadcasters v. Crisp, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2379 (W.D. Okla. 1986). In
the wake of campaigns against drunk driving, there is renewed controversy over the pro-
priety of broadcast or cable advertising of any alcoholic beverages and the use of counter-
advertising messages. See, eg., Beer- Wine Strategy Moves to Counterads, Broadcasting,
May 27, 1985 at 70.
57. In 1971, the Commission admonished broadcasters, under the public interest
standard, to make reasonable efforts to understand lyrics that allegedly glorify and pro-
mote illegal drug use, and to judge the wisdom of airing such music. See Licensee Re-
sponsibility to Review Records, 28 F.C.C.2d 409 (1971) (pub. notice). The clear import
of the Notice was that licensees should remove lyrics that offend the Commission from
programming, or risk sanction. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 414 U.S. 914, 915
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). One Commissioner, however,
called this attitude a blind attack, inspired by the Nixon Administration, on the youth
culture, and an "unsuccessfully-disguised effort by the Federal Communications Com-
mission to censor song lyrics that the majority disapproves of;... [it was] an unconstitu-
tional action by a Federal agency aimed clearly at controlling the content of speech." See
Licensee Responsibility to Review Records, 28 F.C.C.2d 409, 412 (1971) (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting). The Commission immediately clarified its Notice, stating that it
was not attempting to censor any particular record or class of records, with the possible
exception of records creating a "clear and present danger." See Licensee Responsibility
to Review Records, 31 F.C.C.2d 377, 378 (1971).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected a first amendment chal-
lenge to the FCC's action. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 597-99
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973). Judge Bazelon, however, sought, sua
sponte, a rehearing en banc because he thought that the Commission's action could be
construed as censorship. He also believed that the case presented the issue whether the
FCC could regulate material that the first amendment would not allow to be regulated in
[Vol. 55
THE SIGNAL CABLE SENDS
lotteries"8 ; contests59 ; sponsorship identification'; network programming
and prime time access rules6"; and children's programming. 62
the print media. See id. 478 F.2d at 603-06 (statement of Bazelon, J.). Justice Douglas
answered this question in the negative in his dissent from the denial of certiorari. See
Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 414 U.S. 914, 916-17 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
The issue of offensive song lyrics is being raised again in the context of sexually explicit
or suggestive material. See infra note 234.
58. A specific criminal statute bans broadcast of lottery information, except for state-
run lotteries. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1307 (1982); see also Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(6), 312(b), 503(b)(1)(E) (providing sanctions for violation of § 1304);
Broadcast of Lottery Information, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1986). The state lottery excep-
tion was added after the Third Circuit reversed an FCC ban on broadcasting a daily
winning state lottery number. See New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States,
491 F.2d 219, 222-24 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 371 (1975). The court was trou-
bled by the censorship aspect of the FCC's ban. It reasoned that such information was
news outside the criminal statute's scope, which it construed as limited to advertising and
promotional material. See id. at 223-24. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. See
United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n, 417 U.S. 907 (1974). After argument
but before decision, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2) (1982), which exempted
from the ban state lottery advertising and information broadcast in the lottery state or
adjacent lottery states. The Supreme Court, therefore, remanded the case to consider
whether it had become moot. See United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n,
420 U.S. 371, 374 (1975) (per curiam). The Third Circuit, however, held that it was not
moot because broadcasts in non-lottery states would still be barred thereby interfering
with the dissemination of news. The court, therefore, reaffirmed its rejection of the
FCC's construction of § 1304. See New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States,
34 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 825 (3d Cir. 1975).
59. Stations are allowed to run contests and game shows subject to regulations requir-
ing fairness in the games, disclosure of material terms and non-rigging. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 509 (1982); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1216 (1986); see also Broadcast of Station Contests, 37 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 260 (1976). These are basically anti-fraud provisions that arose out of
the scandals over rigged quiz shows. See generally S. Head & C. Sterling, supra note 23,
at 209-11 (discussing the quiz show scandals of the 1950's).
60. Similarly, scandals over "payola" and "plugola", see S. Head & C. Sterling, supra
note 23, at 375-76, led to disclosure requirements for any consideration paid or received
for the broadcast of an advertisement or promotional or political message. See 47 U.S.C.
§§ 317-508 (1982); 47 C.F.R § 73.1212 (1986); see also Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443,
1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding FCC requirements that broadcast licensees identify the
sponsors of paid political announcements), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1984).
61. The Prime Time Access Rule (PTAR) requires that, subject to certain exceptions,
network affiliates devote at least one of the four daily "prime time" hours to non-net-
work programming. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1986); see also Responsibility in Network
Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970) (original PTAR); Consideration of
Prime Time Access Rule, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081 (1974) (considering changes or recission of
rule); Consideration of Prime Time Access Rule, 50 F.C.C.2d 829 (1975) (subsequent
modifications of PTAR). The prime time hours are 7-11 P.M. Eastern and Pacific Time;
6-10 P.M. Central and Mountain Time. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1986).
The first version of the PTAR was challenged on statutory and constitutional grounds
in Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971). The court held
that the rules promote the first amendment goal of diversity and rejected an analogy to
newspapers on the basis of the theory developed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969), that the peculiar qualities of each medium must be considered in
applying the first amendment. See ML Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 477. Subsequent FCC
action and court opinions have modified these rules while maintaining their basic struc-
ture, though with very mixed results. See National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers
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This Article, however, chiefly addresses control over programming
that is potentially offensive as it concerns sexual matters in an arguably
indecent way. In a prophetic passage from its 1960 Programming Policy
Statement, the FCC asserted that the broadcast of nudity, profanity, or
the depiction of sexual activity might raise serious questions, regardless
of the propriety of such material in print. 63 The Commission based this
distinction on the accessibility of television and radio in the home and to
children.' Considering the broad context in which the FCC asserts con-
siderable control over program content, one might think that proscribing
sexually indecent broadcast material would be an a fortiori matter for the
Commission. These issues, however, arose for the Commission contem-
poraneously with the Supreme Court's developing obscenity jurispru-
dence. Becoming entangled in that quagmire, the Commission vacillated
as to its proper role. The controversy over indecent broadcast program-
ming, therefore, has a particularly interesting history that is central to an
understanding of Pacifica and the current, parallel dispute over cable
indecency.
and Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 529-30, 532-35 (2d Cir. 1975); National Ass'n of
Indep. Television Producers and Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1974).
The Commission also has regulated the networks directly by precluding distribution of
and profit-sharing in domestic syndication of programs and restricting such activities in
foreign markets to wholly network-produced programs. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.6580)(1986). These rules have been upheld as "'reasonably ancillary'" to the FCC's regula-
tion of television broadcasting. See Mt. Mansfield, 442 F.2d at 481-82 (quoting United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 158 (1968)); see also CBS, Inc., 87
F.C.C.2d 30 (1981) (mem. op. & ord.), affid sub nom. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 672
F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1982). The Commission proposed eliminating or relaxing these finan-
cial interest and syndication rules, see Amendment of Syndication and Financial Interest
Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,959 (1982) (proposed July 3, 1982); Amendment of Syndication
and Financial Interest Rules, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,020 (1983) (to amend 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.6580)(1)(i) & (ii)) (proposed Aug. 22, 1983), but encountered stiff opposition from
independent film producers and from Congress. See Smith, New Proposals in Syndication
Talks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1983, at 19, col. 1.
62. For a discussion of children's programming issues, see Winer, supra note 3, at
278-82.
63. See Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960). Specifically, the Com-
mission stated:
[R]adio and TV programs enter the home and are readily available not only
to the average normal adult but also to children and to the emotionally imma-
ture.... Thus, for example, while a nudist magazine may be within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment .... the televising of nudes might well raise a
serious question of programming contrary to 18 U.S.C. 1464 .... Similarly,
regardless of whether the "4-letter words" and sexual description set forth in
'lady Chatterley's Lover',[sic] (when considered in the context of the whole
book) make the book obscene for mailability purposes, the utterance of such
words or the depiction of such sexual activity on radio or TV would raise simi-
lar public interest and Section 1464 questions.
Id.
64. See infra notes 87-91 & 320-25.
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B. Control Over Sexually Explicit Broadcast Programming
1. Development of Obscenity and Indecency Jurisprudence
To appreciate the treatment of indecency in broadcasting by the Com-
mission and the courts, it is necessary to keep in mind the underlying
development of judicial approaches to obscene and indecent expression.
Applying this background to the broadcasting context, one can argue
that it should have been fairly easy for a majority of the Court in Pacifica
to repudiate the FCC's heavy-handed sanction of that broadcast.
At about the same time that the FCC began to deal with particular
incidents of alleged broadcast indecency, the Supreme Court first ruled,65
in Roth v. United States,66 that obscenity is not entitled to first amend-
ment protection and thus began its long, continuing struggle to define
obscenity.67 Nine years later in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,68 the Court
attempted to refine the concept of obscenity. The result was so unsatis-
factory 69 that, between 1967 and 1973, the Court rendered at least thirty-
one per curiam reversals of obscenity convictions whenever at least five
Justices, applying their separate tests, found the material not obscene.7"
65. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 653-54 n.4 (1968) (Douglas, Black, JJ.,
dissenting).
66. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In the "fighting words" case of Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), however, the Court, in dictum, described the "lewd and ob-
scene" as one of four categories of expression not entitled to first amendment protection.
See id. at 571-72.
67. The lexicon of obscenity includes many variants such as "pornography" (hard- or
soft-core), "filthy" or "dirty" expression, "indecency" and the like. Putting aside meta-
phorical implications of such variants, this Article reserves the term "obscenity" to de-
scribe that content or manner of expression that meets whatever legal test is in vogue for
denying full first amendment protection. Even so, with its preoccupation with sex and
excretion, see infra note 72, legal obscenity seems to overlap only partially with what
could be considered obscene in the true, broad meaning of that word-"disgusting to the
senses" or "grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is appropriate."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1557 (5th ed. 1981). See Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 n.2 (1973); see also infra note 328. Perhaps this is why questions
of obscenity have produced "a variety of views among the members of the Court un-
matched in any other cause of constitutional adjudication." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968) (citation omitted) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("No other aspect of the First Amendment has, in recent years,
demanded so substantial a commitment of our time, generated so much disharmony of
views, and remained so resistant to the formulation of stable and manageable
standards.").
68. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
69. The Roth test for obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (footnote
omitted). Memoirs added two requirements to the dominant appeal to prudent interest.
First, the material must be "patently offensive because it affronts contemporary commu-
nity standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters." Second, a
court must find that "the material is utterly without redeeming social value." Memoirs,
383 U.S. at 418.




Finally, in Miller v. California7 1 and four other cases decided the same
day, a 5-4 majority announced the Court's current tripartite definition of
obscenity.72
Thus, while the FCC and lower courts were dealing with broadcast
indecency, they were guided by the Supreme Court's position that ob-
scenity is outside the protection of the first amendment and by its chang-
ing, abstract test for obscenity, which the Court itself had great difficulty
applying. Yet, in most of the broadcasting cases, the FCC purported to
act against material that was offensive or indecent, not against obscene
material.7 3 Several other trends, therefore, that the Court developed in
dealing with indecent expression are arguably more relevant.
First, the Court has maintained a fairly strict dichotomy between un-
protected obscenity and all other expression, which is protected. 74 It
71. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
72. The Miller test asks:
(a) [Whether 'the average person applying contemporary community stan-
dards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). The other four cases are: United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); and Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). In a few examples, the Court tried to indicate the sort of
offensive representations or descriptions of sexual or excretory matters with which it was
concerned. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25-26; see also infra note 165.
73. See infra Part I.B.2
74. The Supreme Court has gradually eroded such a two-tiered approach for other
categories of expression once not entitled to first amendment protection. See Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (commercial speech not protected by first amend-
ment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (the "lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words" are outside the first
amendment's protection). Thus, labeling certain expression as libel, profanity, fighting
words, or commercial speech will no longer automatically preclude first amendment ap-
plication. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557,
561-66 (1980) (granting commercial speech substantial first amendment protection); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-70 (1976) (same); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) (state
statute prohibiting use of "obscene or opprobrious language" void for overbreadth);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 519-20 (1972) (state statute proscribing fighting words void
on its face); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("[L]ibel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 506 (1952) (state cannot bar films deemed "sacrilegious"). See generally Krat-
tenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science
Theory, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1123, 1178-91 (1978) (describing the two-tier approach and its
considerable decline).
In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court took obscenity one step in the
same direction by holding that an individual may not be criminally prosecuted for pos-
sessing and viewing obscene material in his own home. See id. at 568. The Court, how-
ever, has shown no inclination to extend further protection for obscenity. See United
States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125-28 (1973) (declining to
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therefore takes a permissive attitude toward offensive but nonobscene ex-
pression, even when inflicted in public on those who object. In Cohen v.
California,5 for example, Cohen was convicted for wearing a jacket bear-
ing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse corridor where there
were women and children.76 The lack of any erotic content to Cohen's
jacket eliminated any question of obscenity, and the Court held that the
state could not proscribe its nonobscene offensiveness." In Justice
Harlan's words, "one man's vulgarity [often] is another's lyric," and "the
State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is gram-
matically palatable to the most squeamish among us.""
The next year, a divided Court vacated and remanded three cases,"9
involving indecent language and "fighting words," for reconsideration in
light of Cohen and Gooding v. Wilson, so a "fighting words" case the
extend Stanley to importation of obscene material for private, personal use). The Oregon
Supreme Court, however, has held that:
[c]haracterizing expression as "obscenity" under any definition, be it Roth,
Miller, or otherwise, does not deprive it of protection under the Oregon Consti-
tution.... In this state any person can write, print, read, say, show or sell
anything to a consenting adult even though that expression may be generally or
universally considered "obscene."
State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 525, 732 P.2d 9, 17-18 (1987).
75. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
76. Id. at 16. Cohen testified that his jacket was intended to express the depth of his
feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft, thereby giving the case overtones of
political speech. Id.
77. See id. at 25-26.
78. Id. at 25.
79. The three cases are: Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972), in which the
appellant was convicted under a statute prohibiting indecent and offensive language in
public places that either might incite an immediate breach of the peace or, in light of the
age and gender of the listeners and the setting, was likely "'to affect the sensibilities of a
hearer.'" Id. at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Profaci, 56 NJ. 346, 353,
266 A.2d 579, 583-84 (1970)). At a school board meeting in the presence of women and
children, appellant on four occasions referred to school and town officials as "m- f-
." Id.; Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), in which a statute prohib-
iting the use of "obscene or opprobrious language" to a policeman on duty was applied to
a mother who called police officers arresting her son "g- d- m- f- police."
Rosenfeld, 408 U.S. at 909-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S.
914 (1972), in which Brown was convicted of using "'obscene or lascivious language or
word[s] in any public place, or in the presence of females.'" See Rosenfeld, 408 U.S. at
911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At a meeting in a university chapel, he referred to police-
men as "n- f- fascist pig cops" and "black m - f- pig." See Rosenfeld,
408 U.S. at 911.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, who had dissented in Gooding, also dis-
sented in each of these cases, as did Justice Rehnquist, who had not participated in Good-
ing. Justice Powell, who also did not participate in Gooding, dissented in Rosenfeld but
concurred in the results in Lewis and Brown. When Lewis returned to the Court in 1974,
the conviction simply was reversed on overbreadth grounds. See Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 131 (1974). Justice Powell concurred in this disposition while the
other three dissenters continued to object.
80. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Gooding involved an anti-war picketer convicted under a
Georgia statute proscribing "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a
breach of the peace." See id. at 519. In the course of struggling with policemen the
picketer exclaimed, "'White son of a bitch, I'll kill you.... You son of a bitch, if you
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Court had decided. The Court's approach of adhering to a strict and
narrow definition of obscenity8" and tolerating all other offensive expres-
sion, even if indecent and public,82 was later confirmed in Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville.83
In Erznoznik, the manager of a drive-in movie theater was charged
with violating a municipal ordinance against exhibiting a motion picture
containing human nudity visible from any public street or place. The
movie screen was visible from two adjacent streets and a nearby church
parking lot. Although the ordinance clearly restricted material that was
not obscene, the city claimed it could enforce it to supress a nuisance as a
legitimate exercise of the police power. The Supreme Court, however,
invalidated the ordinance, rejecting the City's arguments that its action
was permissible either to protect its citizens in general against "unwilling
exposure to materials that may be offensive" or to protect children.8 a
Rather, the Court held that unwilling adult viewers could avert their
eyes,85 and that the ordinance was overbroad as to children because not
all nudity can be deemed obscene as to minors.86
Contrary to this permissive trend, and perhaps indicative of the unset-
tled positions toward obscenity among the Justices, the Court, in parallel
developments, began reducing protection for indecent but nonobscene
expression in special circumstances. In Ginsberg v. New York, 7 for exam-
ple, the Court employed "variable concepts of obscenity" to reject a fa-
cial challenge to a New York statute making it a crime to sell directly to
minors under seventeen material that is obscene as to them - that is,
material "harmful to minors."88 The Court thus adjusted the definition
ever put your hands on me again I'll cut you all to pieces.'" Id. at 519, n.1 (quoting from
the indictment as set out in Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 534, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449(1967)). The Court voided the statute on its face as overbroad and affirmed the federal
district court's reversal of the conviction. See id. at 528.
81. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-501 (1985) (state
obscenity statute invalid insofar as it defines "prurience" in terms of "lust"); Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (the film Carnal Knowledge not obscene based on the
Court's own viewing of the film).
82. See, e.g., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 699 (1974) (per curiam) (use of
language "chicken shit" in courtroom testimony could not sustain a conviction for crimi-
nal contempt for insolent behavior in court.); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08
(1973) (person who during a campus antiwar demonstration shouted, "We'll take the
fucking street later (or again)" could not be charged under a disorderly conduct statute
because this language was neither obscene, nor "fighting words," nor incitement of immi-
nent lawlessness); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 667, 671 (1973) (per
curiam) (graduate student at state university, who was expelled for using the expression
"m- f- " in a publication to be distributed on campus, ordered reinstated).
Again Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, dissented in
each case. See Eaton, 415 U.S. at 701; Hess 414 U.S. at 109; Papish, 410 U.S. at 673.
83. 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
84. Id. at 208, 212.
85. See id. at 211.
86. See id. at 213.
87. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
88. Id. at 631-33. That Ginsberg is limited to distribution specifically aimed at minors
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of obscenity to what it called "social realities."8 9 Consequently, the
Court upheld regulation of material even though it did not meet the cur-
rent obscenity standards for adults.90 The Court recently extended its
particular concern for children by unanimously holding in New York v.
Ferber9 1 that child pornography is not entitled to first amendment
protection.92
Similarily, in Ginzburg v. United States,93 a divided Court upheld a
conviction based on material that was not itself obscene. In considering
an alleged violation of a federal obscenity statute for mailing "nonmail-
able" material, the Court ruled that the "question of obscenity may in-
clude consideration of the setting in which the publications were
presented."9" Thus, "pandering" by" 'purveying textual or graphic mat-
ter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest,'" the "'leer of the
sensualist,'" and "a background of commercial exploitation of erotica
solely for the sake of their prurient appeal," 95 could convert otherwise
nonobscene material into proscribable obscenity. Despite objections from
dissenters, who question how such alchemy can be achieved by truthful
advertising, particularly in light of increased protection for commercial
speech, the Court has continued to apply this pandering concept, at least
in close cases.96
Finally, several Justices have developed a troublesome doctrine that
potentially would allow broad regulation of indecent or offensive, but
nonobscene, speech based upon the purported lack of value of such ex-
is clear from its egregious facts. A sixteen year old boy was enlisted by his mother to
purchase two "girlie" magazines from a "mom-and-pop" luncheonette so that the owners
could be prosecuted. Id. at 671-72. (Fortas, J., dissenting).
The Court adopted the concept of variable obscenity from a New York state case stat-
ing that "the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to the
group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined."
Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671,
271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12
(1966)). See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 85 (1960) ("Variable obscenity ... furnishes a
useful analytical tool for dealing with the problem of denying adolescents access to mate-
rial aimed at a primary audience of sexually mature adults.").
89. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.
90. The statutory test for "harmful to minors" was based on the obscenity standards
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966), as applied to an audience of minors. See Ginsberg at 635-36. But the
magazines were not obscene for adults, see id. at 634, and the Court avoided deciding
whether they were obscene for youths under seventeen because plaintiff challenged the
New York statute on its face and did not dispute the finding of obscenity. See id. at 636.
91. 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see also infra note 107.
92. See id. at 773-74.
93. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
94. Id. at 465 (quoting in part Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957)).
95. Id. at 467-68. Defendant, for example, had sought for his magazine mailing privi-
leges from the postmasters of the towns of Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania. Id.
at 467.
96. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1978); Splawn v. California,
431 U.S. 595, 598-601 (1977).
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pression. This sliding scale of first amendment protection, which de-
pends on the Justices' value judgments, originated from dicta in Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters.97 In that
case, the Court upheld, against a vagueness attack, local ordinances that
restricted where adult movie theaters could operate. A bare majority
dismissed as insignificant the ordinances' possible deterrence of showing
films protected by the first amendment. The Court, further, was not
overly concerned about doubtful cases because "there is surely a less vital
interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline
between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemina-
tion of ideas of social and political significance., 98
In a latter part of his opinion, joined only by the Chief Justice and
Justices White and Rehnquist, Justice Stevens defended the content-
based zoning restraint. He reasoned that, although erotic materials with
some arguably artistic value could not be suppressed entirely under the
first amendment,9 9 "it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this
type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the
interest in untrammeled political debate."'" Justice Stevens, however,
cited neither legal nor empirical evidence to support these propositions
that he claimed were "surely" true and "manifest." Moreover, each
proposition can be read as asserting only the familiar notion of a "central
meaning of the First Amendment"'01 revolving around political speech
necessary for a self-governing, democratic society, and that all other ex-
pression pales in importance, though not necessarily in first amendment
protection. 102 Indeed, the four dissenting Justices in Young character-
97. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
98. Id. at 61. Justice Powell, who joined this part of Stevens' opinion, nonetheless
disassociated himself from these remarks. See id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). See
infra note 104.
99. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71 n.10 (1981).
100. Young, 427 U.S. at 70. But see American Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) (pornography, which influences social relations and politics
on a grand scale and controls attitudes, as such is not "low value" speech), aftid mem.,
106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
101. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
102. Compare A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948),
in Political Freedom (1965) at 24-27 (suggesting a narrow scope to "political speech"
entitled to first amendment protection) with Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Ab-
solute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255-57 (1961) (full protection of the first amendment
extends over a wide range of "human communictions from which the voter derives the
knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values"). But see A. Bickel, The Morality
of Consent, 62-63 (1976) (first amendment should protect speech that serves to make the
political process work, but not speech that undermines that process or constitutes a
breach of an otherwise valid law); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299, 302, 304-22
(1978) (first amendment protects political speech-"speech that participates in the
processes of democracy"-but does not protect non-political speech or anti-democratic
speech); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1,
20-35 (1971) (only speech that is explicitly political and, in addition, does not advocate
forcible overthrow of the government or violation of any law should be constitutionally
protected). See generally Redish, The Value of Free Speech, in Freedom of Expression 1-
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ized the Court's opinion as an "aberration,"' 0 3 and specifically denied
that the objectionable nature of the films diminished in any way their
constitutionally protected status."°
Justice Stevens has held tenaciously to this sliding scale valuation of
speech to determine its constitutional protection.' 5 He has repeatedly
attempted to portray a majority of his colleagues as agreeing with him."06
He has, however, been able to rely in this regard only on Chief Justice
Rehnquist and former Chief Justice Burger. In Pacifica, when this issue
was last squarely addressed, all the other Justices either specifically dis-
avowed the sliding scale approach or ignored it.'0 7
86 (1984) (discussing the values free speech serves and the consequent constitutional pro-
tection to be given various forms of expression).
103. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). But see Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106
S.Ct. 925, 929-30 (1986), (invoking Stevens' plurality opinion in Young to uphold a zon-
ing ordinance restricting the locations of adult movie theaters by finding that the ordi-
nance was not aimed at the content of the films shown but at the "secondary effects" of
the theaters on the community).
104. "The fact that the 'offensive' speech here may not address 'important' topics-
'ideas of social and political significance,' in the Court's terminology-does not mean that
it is less worthy of constitutional protection." Young, 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Justice Powell, concurring in part of the Court's
opinion, also disagreed with the notion "that nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated
differently under First Amendment principles from other forms of protected expression."
Id. at 73 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring).
105. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 781 n.5 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,412 n.4 (1984) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("[O]nce again the Court embraces the obvious proposition that some
speech is more worthy of protection than other speech") (emphasis added); Ferber, 458
U.S. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("[tioday the Court accepts [my]
view").
107. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring); id. at 762-63 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 777-80 (Stewart,
Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (ignoring sliding scale approach and basing
analysis on statutory construction of "indecent"). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 & n.5 (1985) (Powell, J.) ("We have long
recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.").
The Court's unanimity in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), holding child
pornography unprotected does not contradict the majority's disavowal of Stevens' sliding
scale approach. Certainly those Justices who steadfastly and explicitly have opposed such
an approach did not abandon that position sotto voce in Ferber. In fact, only 5 Justices
joined the Court's opinion in Ferber. Further, Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the
judgment, criticized the majority for labelling all materials affected by New York's child
pornography statute as of de minimis first amendment value. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 776-
77 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., concurring). Even Justice Stevens disagreed with the major-
ity's view that the entire category of speech described in the statute is totally without first
amendment protection. See id. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Moreover, Ferber should be viewed as a "conduct" case rather than a "speech" case.
The Court makes clear that the New York statute at issue is aimed at the sexual abuse
and exploitation of children. See id. at 759-60. On that basis, the Court will presumably
allow states to interdict child pornography as the end product of such activities, even if
by itself it is nonobscene expression, because the Court was persuaded that this may be
the only practical way to attack the underlying problem. See id. at 759-62. Moreover, the
Court suggested that simulation of child pornography by young-looking persons over the
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Thus, when Pacifica reached the Supreme Court, the Court had an
established, if not unanimous, approach to obscenity that easily pre-
cluded a finding that the Carlin monologue at issue was obscene. And,
there was ample authority for affording first amendment protection to
virtually all nonobscene expression, even if offensive, indecent, and pub-
lic. The pandering element of Ginzburg v. United States,' was not rele-
vant in Pacifica, and the broadcast did not involve specific distribution
directed to minors as in Ginsberg v. New York. 10 9 Finally, the sliding
scale approach enjoyed the firm support of only three Justices.
Pacifica, then, should have garnered a majority of the Court to reject
FCC sanction of the broadcast. Pacifica, however, arose in the context of
broadcasting, and this factor made all the difference. To appreciate why
this was so, and how the Court inappropriately adapted the facts and
casually relied on its own as well as administrative precedents, it is neces-
sary to look at the colorful, but tentative, background of FCC regulation
of indecency in broadcast programming.
2. Regulation of Broadcast Indecency
Specific instances of allegedly indecent language on radio did not be-
come a significant problem for the Commission until the mid-1950's." 0
At that time, it first considered indecent programming as one factor in
determining the award of a new commercial television license between
two competing radio stations."' One station had broadcast certain re-
corded songs "in less than good taste" with some language that conveyed
"a double meaning in its suggestive content" or was "vulgar.""' 2 The
station objected to the finding of a lack of good taste. Moreover, it had
the temerity to argue that, in fulfilling its role as an outlet for local self-
expression, it had to consider minority groups, as well as majority tastes,
to provide balanced programming. This challenge to the Commission's
authority failed. The Commission rejected the idea that it was barred
statutory age would be outside the reach of the statute, thereby demonstrating that it was
more concerned with protecting children from being used in the underlying activity than
with the resulting expression. See id. at 763. Further, the Court strained to note that
child pornography that is not obscene retains first amendment protection if it does not
involve live performances or visual reproduction thereof. Thus, for example, written de-
pictions of children engaged in sexual activity, created without the actual use of children,
remain protected. See id. at 764-65.
108. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
109. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
110. Nevertheless, prior to the 1950's, the FRC denied renewal to some licensees be-
cause of specific broadcast language that was obscene, indecent or otherwise deemed not
in the public interest. See Norman Baker (station KTNT) v. FRC, 5th FRC Ann. Rep.
78 (1931), notice of dismissal, 6th FRC Ann. Rep. 22 (1932); William B. Schaeffer
(KVEP) v. FRC, 4th FRC Ann. Rep. 46 (1930), notice of dismissal, 5th FRC Ann. Rep.
73 (1931); see also Wolfe, Norman Baker and KTNT, 12 J. Broadcasting 389 (1968) (his-
tory of Norman Baker's controversial broadcasting career and his on-air promotion of a
cure for cancer). See supra note 24.
111. See WREC Broadcasting Serv. & WMPS v. FCC, 19 F.C.C. 1082, 1106 (1955).
112. Id. The Commission cited no examples.
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from examining programs "pander[ing] to any taste, however low,' '3
and awarded the new license to the other applicant.
This first confrontation over indecent language arose over the Com-
mission's award of a new license to one of two competing applicants.
This decision was committed to the Commission's discretion and, there-
fore, difficult to challenge. Nevertheless, the possible consequences of
challenging the Commission's authority over indecent programming was
not lost on licensees. In Mile High Stations, Inc v. FCC,"4 the radio
station agreed to accept a cease and desist order in lieu of revocation
proceedings as a result of its broadcast, over several weeks, of certain
offensive remarks and sound effects."' The Commission specifically
based its authority to sanction the station on its finding that the language
broadcast did not serve the public interest. It dismissed section 326, the
anticensorship provision of the Communications Act,'16 finding no pro-
tection for the sort of remarks at issue."
7
Licensees, however, soon began to challenge the Commission, particu-
larly when it purported to act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1464, a federal
statute prohibiting "obscene, indecent, or profane language" in the me-
dium of "radio communication."" 8 In the Palmetto Broadcasting Co. "
113. Id. at 1113.
114. 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960).
115. See id. at 796-97. In an Appendix, the Commission gave some examples of the
offending material, which included mildly suggestive comments by an announcer, poor
jokes such as, "[D]id you hear about the guy who goosed the ghost, and got a handful of
sheet," sound effects of a toilet being flushed, and on-the-air telephone conversations be-
tween the announcer and college or junior high school female students. See id. at 798.
The Commission found it "especially deplorable" that the remarks in question, "offensive
in any context," occurred on programs that included young people. See id. at 796. The
station president admitted the poor taste in broadcasting the remarks but attributed them
to one announcer who had violated station policy and had been fired. See id.
116. See supra note 19.
117. Mile High Stations, 28 F.C.C. at 796-97.
118. This section reads in full: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
Such a prohibition originally was part of the anticensorship provisions- 29 of the
Radio Act and § 326 of the Communications Act-but was moved to the criminal code
by the 1948 general recodification of federal criminal law. See Gagliardo v. United
States, 366 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1966); Pub. L. No. 772, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. 1948, ch.
645, 62 Stat. 769. Nonetheless, the Communications Act retains several sanctions for
violation of § 1464 such as fines, see 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and
license revocation, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (6) (1982). This raises the issue of a federal agency
imposing sanctions for the alleged violation of a criminal statute without any criminal
proceeding, let alone a conviction. See infra note 191.
Even cable is now subject to statutory restrictions on obscene, indecent, and profane
material. See infra notes 261-81 and accompanying text. Further, "radio communica-
tion" in § 1464 probably includes television. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982) (" 'Radio
communication' or 'communication by radio' means the transmission by radio of writing,
signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds"). Ironically, the reference in § 1464 to
the described language probably leaves visual images on broadcast television unrestricted
by the statute. See 131 Cong. Rec. S 5543 (daily ed. May 7, 1985) (Letter of Stephen S.
Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division to Senator Jesse Helms, dated May
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license renewal proceedings, the radio station argued that only a court
could find a violation of a criminal statute such as section 1464. The
Commission asserted it could make such a finding. 20 It then avoided the
issue by construing the statutory categories of obscene or indecent not to
include the language in question, which was merely "coarse, vulgar, sug-
gestive and susceptible of indecent, double meaning." 2 ' Instead, the
Commission purported to act under the public interest standard, and
cited KFKB Broadcasting Association v. FRC 2z and Trinity Methodist
Church v. FRC 23 to reject the argument that it could not constitution-
ally consider, in a license renewal proceeding, the broadcast of "smut and
patent vulgarity" unless it rose to the level of obscenity under section
1464.124 Thus, at this stage, the Commission eschewed section 1464 and
established instead the standard of "flagrantly and patently offensive" to
determine what, in addition to the statutory categories of obscenity or
indecency, is contrary to the public interest.125
The Commission soon had a chance to apply this standard in a 1964
case. 126 This case involved the Pacifica Foundation's 27 radio broadcast
24, 1984); see also Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d
418, 424 (1975). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1982), (prohibiting the interstate transporta-
tion of obscene material, which arguably could apply).
119. 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), reconsid. denied, 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963), afdper curiam on
other grounds sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
843 (1964).
120. See id. at 255. The Commission relied on a footnote in FCC v. American Broad-
casting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 289 n.7 (1954), which suggested that the FCC could consider a
license applicant's violation of a federal criminal statute designed to bar certain conduct
by licensees. See id. at 255 n.7; see also Violation by Applicants of Laws of United States,
42 F.C.C.2d 399, 401 (1951) (reaffirming FCC authority to consider unlawful behavior by
license applicant). The FCC, however, acknowledged its uncertainty in applying § 1464
due to the dearth of court decisions construing it. See Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 256 n.7.
121. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 255. Some of the material in question concerned use of
nicknames for certain towns-"Ann's Drawers" for Andrews, "Bloomersville" for
Bloomville-use of the phrase "let it all hang out," a joke about an outhouse being worn
out from use, and the line, "Careful drivers can have accidents. Careful boyfriends can
have accidents too." Id. at 278-79 (initial decision of Hearing Examiner).
122. 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
123. 67 F.2d 850, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). See supra notes 30-40 and accom-
panying text.
124. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 256-57. The Commission believed it would not run afoul
of either 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982), prohibiting censorship of radio by the FCC, or the first
amendment so long as it did not attempt to establish itself as a national arbiter of taste,
substituting its judgment or preference for that of a broadcaster or the public. See id. at
257.
125. See id. at 257. The Commission also alluded to the special circumstance of apply-
ing its standard in the broadcast field. Id. at 257. It referred to its earlier discussion of
the problem of exposing "[tihe housewife, the teenager, [or] the young child" to patently
offensive radio programming. Id. at 256.
126. Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964). Pacifica was seeking an initial license for
one radio station, renewal of licenses for others, and consent to transfer of control of the
Foundation. See id. at 147.
127. The Pacifica Foundation is an educational, non-profit corporation established in
1949 on pacifist ideals. It owns and operates radio stations in Berkeley, Los Angeles,
Houston, New York City and Washington, D.C. Although its stations are non-commer-
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of material such as poems authored and read by Lawrence Ferlinghetti, a
reading of Edward Albee's play "The Zoo Story," a discussion by eight
homosexuals of their attitudes and problems, and other literary read-
ings.12 In a footnote, the Commission reaffirmed its ability to enforce
section 1464 but found that unwarranted here.129 The Commission dis-
avowed a role under the public interest standard to decide matters of
licensee taste or judgment. It contrasted Pacifica's broadcasts with Pal-
metto's substantial pattern of patently offensive operation with no re-
deeming features serving the needs of the broadcast audience. Because,
in the Commission's view, serious literary and social content distin-
guished Pacifica's broadcasts, most of the material, though provocative
and possibly offensive to some, fell clearly within the wide discretion af-
forded to a licensee.13 0 Pacifica, however, admitted that some passages
did not measure up to its own standards of good taste and successfully
explained the lapses so as not to bar license renewal."'
This early Pacifica Foundation case marks a more tolerant approach
by the Commission toward unconventional and potentially offensive pro-
gramming. Indeed, a remarkable feature of the case is that, despite its
blatant value judgment, the FCC was the champion of free speech, while
the broadcasting industry was singular in its lack of support for Pacifica.
The ACLU, the New York Times, and many others rallied behind
Pacifica, but major broadcasting representatives, such as the NAB and
Broadcasting magazine, were silent.'3 2 More ironic still, it soon fell to
several Commissioners to excoriate the NAB and other major broadcast-
ing interests for being overly concerned with commercial matters while
failing to support fundamental free speech issues raised by Pacifica and
cial, they are supported primarily by listener contributions, not by public grants or pri-
vate foundations. See United Fed'n of Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204, 213-14 (1969)
(separate statement of Johnson, Comm'r) (complaint against Pacifica's New York station
for broadcasting poems allegedly containing anti-Semitic material).
128. See Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. at 147. Two other issues in the proceeding were
possible Communist Party influence over Pacifica and an unauthorized transfer of con-
trol, both of which the Commission resolved in Pacifica's favor. See id. at 151-52.
129. Id at 148 n.l.
130. Id at 148-49. Pacifica also had taken care to broadcast, with one minor excep-
tion, this material only after 10 P.M. thereby minimizing the number of children in the
audience. Id at 147.
131. Id at 150. The following year, however, the Commission granted only short-term
(one-year) renewal for several of Pacifica's stations for Pacifica's failure to conform to its
own program supervisory policies and procedures. See Pacifica Found., 6 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 570, 571 (1965).
132. See Barton, The Lingering Legacy of Pacifica: Broadcasters' Freedom of Silence,
53 Journ. Q. 429, 431-32 (1976). Commercial broadcasters apparently were reluctant to
be associated with the controversy. Moreover, they were not too concerned with preserv-
ing the right of an entity like Pacifica to present diverse, unconventional programming
not found on most commercial stations. So even though this decision ultimately favored
the licensee, it did not come until after a long battle with an unavoidable chilling effect on
Pacifica and other broadcasters. See Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media.: A Consti-
tutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 664, 667-71 (1971).
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similar, small unconventional stations. 133
This more tolerant approach was short-lived, however, as changes in
the Commission by a new administration led to a campaign to clean up
the airways, 134 though not without dissent from some Commissioners.
In January, 1970, an award-winning noncommercial educational radio
station in Philadelphia broadcast an interview with Jerry Garcia, leader
of "a California rock and roll musical group," the Grateful Dead. 135
Garcia's comments, broadcast from 10 to 11 P.M., "were frequently in-
terspersed with the words 'f-k' and 's-t,' used as adjectives, or simply
as an introductory expletive or substituted for the phrase, et cetera." 1 36
Neither the Commission nor the station received any complaints about
the program, but the Commission had monitored the broadcast and initi-
ated proceedings on its own motion to assess a forfeiture. 137
This case, WUHY-FM, Eastern Educational Radio, is the predicate for
the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision because the Commission deliber-
133. See Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833, 839-40 (1970) (Cox, Comm'r,
dissenting), reh'g ordered on reconsid., 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970) license renewed, 29
F.C.C.2d 334 (1971). As Commissioner Cox stated, "[Ilt would be encouraging to see the
National Association of Broadcasters come forward instead of leaving the defense of the
perimeters of freedom to the American Civil Liberties Union." Id. at 840. See WBBM-
TV's Broadcast of A Report on A Marihuana Party, 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 155-56 (1969)
(Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting); United Fed'n of Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204, 218-21
(1969) (separate statement of Johnson, Comm'r).
134. Beginning with his appointment as FCC Chairman by President Nixon in Fall,
1969, Dean Burch stressed his particular concern about obscene or indecent program-
ming on the airwaves. In a Meet the Press interview on January 25, 1970, he stated that
"there are certain words that have no redeeming social value." Jack Straw Memorial
Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833, 837 (1970) (Cox, Comm'r, dissenting) (quoting Meet the Press
interview with Chairman Burch Jan. 25, 1970) (emphasis omitted). He then said that the
Commission had abandoned drafting a list of such proscribed words, which he thought
was itself an obscene document, because language has to be considered in context. As a
result, the list alone would be unintelligible. See id. For a description of the Nixon Ad-
ministration's antagonistic attitude toward the broadcast media in general, and network
news in particular, see Whiteside, Annals of Television: Shaking the Tree, The New
Yorker, Mar. 17, 1975, at 41. Whiteside, however, notes that Burch attempted to con-
duct the Commisssion's work in a competent and fair fashion. See id. at 78.
135. WUHY-FM, E. Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 408 (1970). A dissenting Com-
missioner tellingly described his colleagues' estrangement from the lifestyle and language
of a younger generation: "To call The Grateful Dead a 'rock and roll musical group' is
like calling the Los Angeles Philharmonic a 'jug band.' And that about shows 'where this
Commission's at'." Id. at 422 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
136. Id. at 409. The interview was one of a series of "underground" programs, in-
tended for college-age people, dealing with the avante-garde movement in music and the
arts. Id. at 408 n.1.
137. Id. at 409 n.2, 418 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Commission had received some general complaints about WUHY's programming. It
had, however, received far more complaints about major television network programs
like the Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour and the Rowan and Martin Laugh-In than
about programs on small noncommercial radio stations. Nevertheless, the Commission
had never acted against any of the major broadcasters. See Jack Straw Memorial Found.,
21 F.C.C.2d 833, 838-39 (1970) (Cox, Comm'r, dissenting) ("[Tihe Smothers, Rowan
and Martin, and Carson shows have all involved patterns of material that some have
found offensive, rather than the limited incidents at KRAB and the Pacifica stations.").
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ately broke new ground in its legal analysis. 38 The Commission contin-
ued to maintain that it could act under the public interest standard in
clear-cut, flagrant cases such as the one before it.'39 For the first time,"'
however, the Commission also purported to enforce the criminal prohibi-
tion of section 1464. This was not because it considered the broadcast
obscene. Indeed, the FCC conceded it was not obscene because it lacked
a dominant appeal to prurient or sexual matters; rather, the broadcast
was indecent. 1 4
The Commission's standard for evaluating the broadcast material was
the same, however, under either approach: whether the material was pa-
tently offensive under contemporary community standards and utterly
without redeeming social value.14 The Commission also stressed that
crucial differences between radio and other media affect the application
of this standard to broadcasting.1 43  But the true animus behind the
Commission's action may have been its conviction that language like
Garcia's is wholly "gratuitous." In other words, it "conveys no
thought, .... fosters no debate," "serves no social purpose" and is "not
138. See WUHY, 24 F.C.C.2d at 415.
139. See id. at 413-14.
140. In a previous citizen band license revocation proceeding, however, the Commis-
sion's Hearing Examiner adjudicated a violation of § 1464 by applying some of the proce-
dural and substantive standards of a criminal prosecution. See Warren J. Currence, 33
F.C.C. 827, 828 (1962) (requiring FCC to meet the stricter burden of proof of criminal
cases) (initial decision of Hearing Examiner), affid, 34 F.C.C. 761 (1963) (decision of
Review Board). The Hearing Examiner noted there was no direct precedent for inter-
preting "obscene" and "indecent" under § 1464, but relied on Duncan v. United States,
48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931), which construed substantially
identical language in § 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 as equating "indecent" with "ob-
scene." See Warren J. Currence, 33 F.C.C. at 833-34.
141. See WUHY-FM, E. Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412-13 (1970).
142. See id. at 413-14. The Commission asserted that these were the standards that it
had applied in Palmetto. See id; see also Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, 257
(1960).
143. See WUHY, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411. These differences were that radio is dissemi-
nated generally to the public without the deliberate action that reading a book or going to
a movie requires; it frequently comes directly into the home without advance warning of
its content, so that even programs aimed at specific audiences may reach unintended
listeners scanning the dial; and, any such audience may include a large number of chil-
dren. See id. The Commission thus postulated that any significant broadcast of such
material would cause people to avoid the radio or to stop browsing through the dial to
avoid embarrassment and offense from an objectionable program. As a result, such
broadcasts would curtail the usefulness of radio for millions of people. Id. The Commis-
sion believed such a result would be inconsistent with its statutory goal of encouraging
"'larger and more effective use of radio.'" Ie at 412 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)
(1982)).
On the other hand, as one Commissioner noted, "[i]t may be that using radio and
television to help bridge the generation gap would be an example of 'the larger and more
effective use of radio.'" WUHY, 24 F.C.C.2d at 420 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Commissioner Cox also thought it was unlikely that broadcast-
ers, who make money by attracting audiences, would be so shortsighted as to drive listen-
ers away from radio by filling the airwaves with widely offensive programming. Id. at
422 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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essential to the presentation of the subject matter.'""
The WUHY case encompassed all the elements of the broadcast inde-
cency debate that would resurface in Pacifica. The Commission, how-
ever, recognized that there was no judicial or administrative precedent
for its position. In particular, there was no support for distinguishing
"indecent" in section 1464 from "obscene," or for the Commission's au-
thority to control indecency, which could be settled definitively only by
the courts.1 45 Having initiated the proceedings on its own motion, the
Commission then specifically invited judicial review as a test case.146 But
the station simply paid the modest fine and did not appeal, probably be-
cause of financial hardship. 147
A few years later the Commission got its desired court opinion that
established the only direct judicial precedent for Pacifica. The case arose
from the Commission's attempts in the Spring of 1973, motivated and
supported by Congressional pressure,148 to censor the developing phe-
nomenon of so-called "topless radio."' 49 The shows quickly became very
144. Id. at 412-13, 415. At least one of the Commissioners, however, recognized that
Garcia's choice of words might not have been totally divorced from the content of what
he was saying. While agreeing that the language was offensive to many he noted that it
might have been difficult for Garcia to express the same ideas in more conventional
terms. Id. at 418-19 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Another
Commissioner cited Professor Ashley Montague for the proposition that such speech
"'serves clearly definable social as well as personal purposes.'" See id. at 424 (quoting
A. Montague, The Anatomy of Swearing 1 (1967)); cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
26 (1971) ("[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.").
145. See WUHY, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412-13. As Commissioner Johnson put it, "[T]here
are no judicial precedents, no law review articles, no FCC decisions, and no scholarly
thinking that even attempt to define the standards of permissible free speech for the
broadcasting medium." Id. at 424-25. (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). But see supra
note 140.
146. See WUHY, 24 F.C.C.2d at 421 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Indeed, the Commission stated it was imposing a nominal forfeiture of $100.00
to preserve the availability of review, which would have been unavailable if the Commis-
sion simply acted prospectively. See id. at 414-15.
147. As the dissent put it, instead of considering the impact that the major television
networks have on the moral values of the country, the Commission was "picking on little
educational FM radio stations that can scarcely afford the postage to answer our letters,
let alone hire lawyers." See WUHY-FM, E. Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 423 (John-
son, Comm'r, dissenting) (1970); see also supra note 137. Commissioner Johnson called
on the Federal Communications Bar Association, and the broadcasting industry in gen-
eral, to overcome their greater interest in profitable speech rather than free speech and
vigorously to enter amici appearances if there was an appeal. See id. at 424-25.
148. See Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 285, 295 (1973) (not.
of appar. liab.) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting); Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41
F.C.C.2d 777, 778 n.5 (1973) (pet. for reconsid.).
149. "Topless radio" consisted of telephone talk shows appealing largely to housewives
and other women. Such shows included explicit discussions of sexual techniques and
related matters. Various licensees developed such programming including major entities
like Storer Broadcasting Company, Metromedia Broadcasting Company and Sonderling
Broadcasting Corporation. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.); Sonderling, 27 Rad. Reg. 2d(P & F), at 285-86, 290 n.4 (examples of the programming); see also infra note 155.
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popular, even "top rated,"15 but generated a number of listener
complaints."'
The Commission mounted an orchestrated attack 52 on "topless radio"
that included an intimidating address by FCC Chairman Dean Burch to
the NAB's annual national convention.153 As a result, broadcast stations
immediately banned virtually all sexual discussions from their talk shows
to avoid further problems. 54 For one station, however, it was too late.
The FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability to Sonderling Broadcast-
ing Corporation and proposed a $2,000 forfeiture.'55
The Commission stressed that sex per se is not a forbidden subject for
the broadcast media, particularly in works of dramatic or literary art.
Moreover, it eschewed any censorship role under the public interest stan-
dard. Instead, the Commission, relying on its power to enforce section
1464, found the Sonderling broadcasts obscene under the Roth and
Memoirs standards, together with guidelines from Ginzburg. It did not
view the broadcasts as serious discussions of sexual matters but as "titil-
lating, pandering exploitation of sexual materials."' 5 6
On one level, then, the Commission's action was not too problematic
because it simply purported to find obscenity pursuant to current
Supreme Court standards and censor such material under the perceived
authority of section 1464. The Commission, however, clearly applied the
obscenity test in light of the special qualities of the broadcast medium
150. Sonderling, 27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 297 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (citing
a television columnist for the Chicago Tribune).
151. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 778 n.5 (1973) (pet. for recon-
sid.) (complaints of allegedly obscene, indecent, or profane program material increased to
31,048 in fiscal 1973 from 2141 in fiscal 1972).
152. For a detailed description of this attack, see Illinois Citizens, 515 F.2d at 407-10
(statement of Bazelon, C.J.).
153. See id. at 408. The convention passed a resolution deploring "tasteless and vulgar
program content." Id
154. See id at 409. The Commission asserted its sensitivity to allegations that it forced
licensees to abandon controversial, but lawful, programming. Yet, it disingenuously
maintained that such changes were independent programming decisions like those rou-
tinely made by the licensees. The Commission also insisted that it was not mandating the
immediate elimination of all sexual material from the air. See Sonderling, 41 F.C.C.2d at
783-84 (pet. for reconsid.).
155. See Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 Rad. Reg. 2d. (P & F) 285 (1970). The
Commission proceeded against Sonderling even though it had acquiesced by banning all
sexual discussion from its talk shows and so notified the Commission. See Illinois Citi-
zens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (statement of
Bazelon, C.J.). The Commission cited the Femme Forum program that Sonderling
broadcast from 10 A.M. to 3 P.M. Monday through Friday. The program had included
discussions with female listeners of masturbation and how they overcame "hangups" over
oral sex. It also included an exchange with a listener who called in to complain about the
broadcast of such material, particularly with children in the audience. See Sonderling, 27
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 285-86, 290 n.4, 291-92.
156. See Sonderling, 27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 290. The majority's assessment of the
material was clear: "If discussions in this titillating and pandering fashion of... [oral
sex] ... do not constitute broadcast obscenity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, we
do not perceive what does or could." Id
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that it had identified in WUHY.'57 In so deciding the case, the Commis-
sion strangely maintained that the constitutional standards for obscen-
ity-such as an appeal to prurient interest and lack of redeeming social
value-could differ for the same material presented in different media.I58
Instead, it could have taken the more plausible, if no less controversial,
position that differences in the media allow different standards to deter-
mine what material can be regulated or banned.
Moreover, the Commission alternatively construed "indecent" under
section 1464 as something less than obscene in the broadcast field. Thus,
even if Sonderling's broadcasts did not appeal to a prurient interest, they
were patently offensive and without redeeming social value and, there-
fore, could be proscribed.159 The Commission's action, therefore, again
raised the issue of the scope of its power to censor. Recognizing the
uncertainty and absence of judicial guidance, the Commission again ex-
plicitly "welcome[d] and urge[d] judicial consideration" of its action.'I'
The resulting appeal by concerned citizens16 1 produced the first oppor-
tunity for substantive judicial review of the Commission's policy toward
obscene and indecent broadcast material. 162 The court, however, largely
ignored this opportunity. On the crucial issue of the obscenity of the
157. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. The Commission reiterated that these
special qualities are that broadcasting is a medium designed to be received and sampled
ubiquitously and almost casually, as an "electronic smorgasborg" with free access to the
home "without regard to age, background or degree of sophistication" of the listeners.
See Sonderling, 27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 288. While the Commission based its conclu-
sion on the generally "pervasive and intrusive nature of the broadcast radio," the poten-
tial for children in the broadcast audience made it an a fortiori matter. See id. at 290.
158. Id. at 288-89; cf id. at 296 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
159. See id. at 292.
160. Id. at 293. A dissenting Commisssioner, however, challenged the Commission's
finding of obscenity, and its special treatment of the broadcast medium. He further chal-
lenged the notion that nonobscene, but "indecent," material could be regulated unless it
was impossible for an unwilling listener to avoid exposure to it. He even took issue with
the propriety of Commission rather than judicial action, with the consequent "Big
Brother" chilling effect from such action by the licensing agency. See id. at 294 (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting).
161. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Although Sonderling vehemently protested the Commission's decision, it paid the forfei-
ture stating that it could not sustain the tremendous financial burden of testing the consti-
tutional issues involved. Id. at 410 (statement of Bazelon, C.J.) (quoting letter from
Sonderling to FCC). Thus, the Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and the
Illinois Division of the ACLU pursued the matter, thereby creating some procedural
difficulties in obtaining review of all relevant issues. Id. at 403.
162. In an intervening reconsideration the Commission disavowed any broad chilling
effect and tried to dispel the notion that it was intent on censoring all material dealing
with sex. See Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 783-84 (1973) (pet. for
reconsid.). But see Illinois Citizens, 515 F.2d at 421 (statement of Bazelon, C.J.) (accord-
ing little weight to FCC's assertation that it did not intend broad self-censorship of broad-
casting by its decision in Sonderling). The Commission also reaffirmed its finding of
obscenity in the broadcast context under the new criteria announced by the Supreme
Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which had been decided just after the
Notice of Apparent Liability in Sonderling. See Sonderling, 41 F.C.C.2d at 782 n.14.
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broadcast,16 the court upheld the Commission's finding in a curious
way. Although the Commission originally had found the program ob-
scene under the Roth and Memoirs standards, the court held that the
new Miller criteria, which it recognized both expanded and contracted
the definition of obscenity, controlled. 165 The court, however, then af-
firmed the Commission's action which, in fact, complied with neither the
Roth/Memoirs standards nor the new Miller standards. 66 Indeed, in a
forceful and lengthy statement explaining why he would grant rehearing
en banc, Chief Judge Bazelon' 67 castigated the court for its numerous
errors, most notably the failure to recognize as blatant censorship the
Commission's general attack on all sex-oriented talk shows. To the Chief
Judge, the Commission's action "illustrat[ed] a whole range of 'raised
eyebrow' tactics" of FCC regulation, instances of which were
"legion. 9168
Initial judicial review of the Commission's attempts to control sexually
oriented broadcast programming as either obscene or indecent thus left
the Commission in a very tenuous and unstable position. Nothing prior
to Pacifica established a satisfactory legal basis or policy for dealing with
such programming. A case like Pacifica, therefore, was bound to reach
the Supreme Court before too long. Unfortunately, Pacifica also failed to
produce anything approaching a well-defined or well-reasoned standard
for the broadcast media.
163. Significantly, because the court upheld the finding of obscenity, it specifically de-
clined to decide whether the Commission's interpretation and application of the term
"indecent" under § 1464 was constitutional. See Illinois Citizens, 515 F.2d at 403 n.14.
164. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
165. As the court explained, Miller expanded the definition of obscenity by replacing
the "utterly without redeeming social value" test with a lack of "serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value." Id at 404. Yet, Miller contracted the definition by limiting
it to materials that "depict or describe patently offensive 'hardcore' sexual conduct specif-
ically defined by the regulating state law." Id. at 405 (quoting Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 27 (1973)).
166. See Illinois Citizens, 515 F.2d at 406. The court, for example, declined to decide if
the statutory specificity required by Miller was satisfied. It also found no problem, under
either set of standards, in the Commission's failure to determine and to apply contempo-
rary community standards. Finally, it approved the Commission's consideration of only
a brief condensation of the offensive material apart from the context of the broadcast as a
whole. See id at 404-06; see also id at 415-20 (statement of Bazelon, CJ.) (discussing the
problems with a finding of obscenity under either the Miller or the Roth/Memoirs
standards).
167. Judge Bazelon was not a member of the panel that heard the case and was the
only one to vote for en banc consideration. See id. at 410 (statement of Bazelon, CJ.)
(court made four groups of errors justifying rehearing en banc).
168. Id at 407-08. For the origins of the "raised eyebrow" view of FCC regulation,
see C. Ferris, F. Lloyd & T. Casey, Cable Television Law 1 3.11 n.5 (1985). Bazelon also
suggested that the root of such overbearing regulation and censorship might be the com-
prehensive licensing scheme creating the pervasive threat of "sub rosa bureaucratic
hassling." Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407, 425
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.).
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3. The Pacifica Case
On a weekday afternoon in October, 1973, Pacifica's New York City
FM radio station WBAI broadcast George Carlin's monologue about
"the words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, and ones
you definitely couldn't say."' 69 WBAI did not broadcast the monologue
for its comedic value, but as an "incisive satirical" contribution to a lis-
tener call-in discussion of contemporary society's attitudes toward lan-
guage. 170 Not everyone so regarded it. Although the broadcast had been
preceded by a warning, one man, driving in Manhattan with his "young"
son, heard at least a portion of the monologue over his car radio and
complained to the FCC. 17 1 As in WUHY, 7 2 no one else complained
either to the Commission or to the station. 173 The Commission did not
issue an order regarding the complaint until its Sonderling174 decision
had been affirmed. Thus emboldened, the Commission used the Pacifica
case to address1 75 the unabated problem of indecency on the air and to
clarify the standards that it would apply to "indecent" language. 176
The Commission based its decision on the analysis in WUHY and
Sonderling as to perceived "unique qualities" of the broadcast medium
that made it "not subject to the same analysis that might be appropriate
169. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Appendix), rev'd, 438
U.S. 726 (1978).
170. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975), on reconsid., 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976),
rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The words Carlin so
identified were "shit, .... piss," "fuck," "cunt," "cocksucker, .... motherfucker," and "tits,"
causing the case to be called the "seven dirty words case." See FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (appendix to Court opinion). A verbatim transcript of the full
monologue is reproduced as an appendix to each court opinion.
Although the Commission requested a recording or script of the entire program, the
station was unable to comply because no recording had been made. Moreover, there was
no script for the live and extemporaneous program. The Commission, therefore, had to
rely upon the licensee's description of the program to place the monologue in proper
context. Pacifica 56 F.C.C.2d at 96.
171. See id. at 95. The "young" son turned out to be fifteen years old. See Robinson,
Another Look at Pacifica, 2 Cable T.V. Law & Finance 1, 6 (Mar. 1984) (article by former
member of FCC that ruled on Pacifica). The complainant was a member of the national
planning board of Morality in Media. See Broadcasting, July 10, 1978, at 20.
172. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
173. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
174. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
175. The Commission issued a Declaratory Order as a "flexible procedure" to termi-
nate the instant controversy and clarify the Commission's standard on indecency. At the
same time, this allowed interested parties to seek reconsideration and judicial review.
Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 99. The Commission did not impose sanctions on Pacifica. In a
rather intimidating manner, however, it associated its order with the station's license file,
for reference in light of any future complaint. See id.; Pacifica, 556 F.2d 20 n.7 (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring).
176. The Commission simultaneously relied on Sonderling and its action against
Pacifica in a report to Congress about actions it was taking to combat television violence
and obscenity. See Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 424-25
(1975).
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for other, less intrusive forms of expression."' 77 But because it was still
unclear whether indecency was distinct from obscenity, and because the
Sonderling court had left in limbo the appropriate obscenity standard for
the Commission to apply,178 the Commission reformulated its concept of
indecency.
179
Although its analysis was less than clear, the Commission first relied
on the Miller standards as adapted by the Ginsberg notion of variable
obscenity. 80 It then indicated that these criteria would be measured in
light of the "unique qualities" of the broadcast medium. The Commis-
sion also strongly suggested that indecent material should be unavailable
even solely to adults, and totally barred such material from the airwaves
if there was a wholly undefined risk of exposure to children. 8 On this
basis, and particularly because WBAI broadcast forbidden words repeat-
edly and deliberately in the early afternoon, when children "undoubt-
edly" were in the audience, the Commission readily concluded that the
language "as broadcast" violated section 1464's ban on indecency.
82
For the first time, a licensee sought judicial review of the Commis-
sion's position on broadcast indecency.8 3 Once again, however, the
court avoided the "perplexing question" whether the unique character-
istcs of radio and television allow the FCC to prohibit nonobscene
speech.184 Instead, Judge Tamm, writing for a sharply divided panel,'
177. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97 (1975), on reconsid, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976),
rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See supra notes 143 & 157.
178. See generally Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397
(D.C. Cir. 1974). When the Commission issued its initial decision in Pacifica the petition
for rehearing en banc in Sonderling was still pending. The Sonderling panel's approach,
therefore, was subject to change and Chief Judge Bazelon's statement criticizing that
approach had not yet been published. See id
179. See Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. The Commission did not consider Carlin's ex-
plicit language to be obscene, see id, although it so labelled the suggestive, but conven-
tionally-worded, discussion of oral sex in Sonderling. See Illinois Citizens, 515 F.2d at
406. The Commission, however, differentiated indecent language from the obscene be-
cause "(1) it lacks the element of appeal to the prurient interest [citing WUHY and...
(2) when children may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has
literary, artistic, political or scientific value." See Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (footnote
omitted).
180. See supra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
181. See Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
182. See id at 99.
183. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978). Just prior to the appellate argument, the Commission released a purported clari-
fication of its original order in Pacifica, pursuant to a petition seeking a ruling that the
Commission did not intend to prohibit indecent language as part of a bona fide news or
public affairs program. The Commission refused to consider such a hypothetical situa-
tion. See Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893, rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd,
483 U.S. 726 (1978). It nevertheless stressed that its Declaratory Order was aimed at
protecting young children from sexually explicit language, and that it was not intended to
place an absolute prohibition on broadcast of such language.
184. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
185. Three separate opinions were filed. Chief Judge Bazelon, who already had criti-
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
discredited the Commission's labelling of its ban simply as a channeling
mechanism to protect children under a nuisance doctrine. 186 The court
then held the Commission's Declaratory Order to be censorship in viola-
tion of section 326. Judge Tamm thus did not have to reach the difficult
and unresolved issue of whether "indecent" in section 1464 could be de-
fined more narrowly than "obscene." '187 Rather, even assuming that the
Commission could act against non-obscene speech under section 1464, he
relied on Erznoznick and Cohen to rule the FCC's Order overbroad and
vague in its application of section 1464.188
On appeal, Judge Tamm's reliance on the prohibition against censor-
ship in section 326 was the opening wedge of Justice Stevens' opinion for
a bare majority of the Court. Based on the common origin and legisla-
tive history of section 326 and section 1464,189 Justice Stevens concluded
that the statutory ban on censorship was inapplicable to the Commis-
sion's authority to sanction obscene, indecent, or profane language. He
reasoned further that the Commission's subsequent review of program
content, as opposed to prior review and editing, was not the censorship
addressed by section 326.190
cized the Commission's Pacifica Order in Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 515
F.2d 397, 418 n.48 (statement of Bazelon, C.J.), agreed with Judge Tamm's result. See
Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 18. He also would have found a constitutional violation, rejecting
broadcast indecency as an additional category of unprotected speech based on the sup-
posedly unique characteristics of broadcasting. See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 24-25. (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring).
Judge Leventhal, the third member of the panel, dissented because he construed the
Commission's Order as a narrow, limited one. He also viewed the Commission's defini-
tion of indecency as the "functional equivalent," in the broadcasting context, of the
Supreme Court's obscenity standard in Miller. See id. at 32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
186. See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 14 (even if it is a "channelling mechanism," the effect is
censorship). The Commission's nuisance doctrine was probably both inapposite and out-
moded. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418 n.48(D.C. Cir. 1977) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.); see also supra note 178. It spawned, how-
ever, a porcine analogy whose odor has permeated this area. See Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at
98 ("The law of nuisance does not say, for example, that no one shall maintain a pigsty
... [but] that no one shall maintain a pigsty in an inappropriate place .... ."); Pacfica,
556 F.2d at 17 ("The Commission's Order is a classic case of burning the house to roast
the pig."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) ("[W]hen the Commis-
sion finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not
depend on proof that the pig is obscene."); id. at 766 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting)
(" 'burn the house to roast the pig' ") (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957)); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985) (In cable indecency case,
"[I]f an individual voluntarily opens his door and allows a pig into his parlor, he is in less
of a position to squeal.").
187. Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 15.
188. See id. at 16-17.
189. See supra note 118.
190. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735-38 (1978). The Court cited KFKB
Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) and
Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1931), ignoring the conflict
between those cases and the Court's contemporaneous prior restraint decision in Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See id. at 736. See supra text accompanying notes 34-
40. The Commission's sanction of Pacifica, although not as drastic as the denial of li-
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Although the Court may have correctly assessed the relationship be-
tween section 326 and section 1464,19' it completely ignored the substan-
tial, well-recognized censorship effect of a raised FCC eyebrow, let alone
a broad Declaratory Order.1 92 A licensee's relationship with the FCC is
a wholly dependent one, and sanctions imposed on one broadcaster have
a chilling effect on all others. Consequently, the Court surely was wrong
in refusing to recognize the Commission's Order as a classic example of
sweeping censorship, regardless of whether such action ultimately was
upheld. 193
Having thus interpreted section 326, the Court turned to a considera-
tion of section 1464 and the meaning of "indecent," particularly whether
it is different from "obscene." This was the major issue on which the
FCC, for some time, had sought judicial guidance but which had been
previously avoided. Incredibly, in a few quick paragraphs, the Court
wholly abdicated its responsibility for constitutional adjudication by rely-
ing on the Commission's "long interpretat[ion of] § 1464 as encompass-
ing more than the obscene."' 94 The Court thus bootstrapped the FCC's
previous scant assertions as to the constitutional meaning of indecency,
and its forthright requests for judicial guidance on this uncertain and
troublesome issue, into authority to determine the very proposition put
in question.' More incredible still, the Court allowed the Commission's
cence renewals in KFKB and Trinity Methodist, nonetheless created a substantial chilling
effect on future programming of all broadcasters. See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 20 n.7
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Illinois Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 422 n.59
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.). See infra note 193.
191. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978). Even Bazelon agreed on
this point. See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 20 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). The Court, however,
brushed aside any issue of the Commission's power to impose civil penalties for violation
of a criminal statute, see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739 n.13, which is far more problematic.
See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 20 n.7 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Illinois Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 515 F.2d 397, 423 n.62 (statement of Bazelon, C.J.). The Commission has
recently announced that, despite past exercise of concurrent jurisdiction to enforce
§ 1464, it now will "exercise greater restraint in this area" and defer, in obscenity cases,
to local authorities. Video 44, 103 F.C.C.2d 1204, 1209-10 (1986) (mem. op. & ord.); see
also infra note 232.
192. The Court simply ruled that the Commission's Declaratory Order, although spe-
cifically designed to clarify its general principles and standards as to indecent language,
see Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 94-95 (1975), on reconsid, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976),
rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), was just a particular adju-
dication which was all the Court would review. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734-35. The
Court thus perpetuated what Chief Judge Bazelon had described as the most pervasive
judicial error: failing to acknowledge and appreciate the entire, well-documented policy
of Commission censorship by focusing instead on individual Commission actions in isola-
tion. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 421-24 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.). Cf infra note 229.
193. Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged that the Commission's Order might lead
some broadcasters to censor themselves. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743.
194. See id. at 741 (footnote omitted).
195. Although the Court arguably was engaged simply in statutory construction of
§ 1464, the definition of "indecent," like the definition of "obscene," is really at the heart
of the first amendment issues. For this reason, in an earlier case construing a similar
statutory prohibition on obscenity in the mails, the Court interpreted the entire phrase
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interpretation to stand in the face of its own and other strong precedent
to the contrary. 196 In other words, the Court allowed what Chief Judge
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" to be limited to the obscene. See
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 112 (1974) (quoting Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day,
370 U.S. 478, 482-84 (1962)). This language was, therefore, controlled by the Miller
standards, and this assured the statute's constitutionality. See id. at 110-16. Moreover,
with regard to a criminal statute such as § 1464, notwithstanding its relationship to civil
penalties under the Communications Act, see supra note 191, there was no justification
for the Court to defer to a regulatory agency's construction. Such deference was wholly
inappropriate with regard to constitutional interpretation. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC,
556 F.2d 9, 22 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978); id. at 35 (Leventhal, J., dissenting); Illinois Citizens, 515 F.2d at 422 n.59 (state-
ment of Bazelon, C.J.).
Indeed, just two months prior to its Pacifica decision the Court ruled: "Deference to a
legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at
stake.... [O]therwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject
to legislative definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative
power would be nullified." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
843-44 (1978); see also Lowe v. SEC, 105 S. Ct. 2557, 2576, 2583-84 (1985) (White,
Rehnquist, JJ., and Burger, C.J., concurring) (in striking down on first amendment
grounds SEC's construction of Investment Advisers Act, the Court, not the SEC or Con-
gress, has the duty to say what the law is); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super
8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973) (in obscenity cases, Supreme Court has "a duty
to authoritatively construe federal statutes where 'a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised' and 'a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.' ") (citing United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971)
(White, J.) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). Accord Johnson v. Robi-
son, 415 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1974) (despite great deference to agency's statutory interpreta-
tion, "'[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congresssional enactments has generally
been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies' ") (quoting Oestereich v.
Selective Serv. Sys., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)). In an earlier
broadcasting case, Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), the Court stated:
[I]n evaluating... First Amendment claims... we must afford great weight
to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the Commission.... That is
not to say we 'defer' to the judgment of the Congress and the Commission on a
constitutional question, or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution
should we determine that the Commission has not fulfilled its task with appro-
priate sensitivity to the interests in free expression.
Id. at 102-03.
196. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 110-15 (1974), (Rehnquist, J.) (follow-
ing Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482-84, 487-88 (Harlan, J.) (1962)). Per-
haps the clearest statement of the Court's previous position on similar federal obscenity
statutes is United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
If and when such a "serious doubt" [as to constitutionality] is raised as to the
vagueness of the words "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy, .... indecent,"
or "immoral" as used to describe regulated material ... we are prepared to
construe such terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive represen-
tations or descriptions of that specific 'hard core' sexual conduct given as exam-
ples in Miller v. California ....
Id. at 130 n.7 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 195 (1977) ("sweeping" language of federal obscenity statute confined within consti-
tutional limits); Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 500-01 (1897) (approving jury
instructions construing the language "obscene, lascivious, lewd or indecent" as having
one meaning of moral depravity); Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446, 450-51
(1896) (statutory language prohibiting the mailing of "obscene, lewd or lascivious" mate-
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Bazelon referred to "most charitably" in this precise context as the
FCC's "total ignorance of the constitutional definition of obscenity" to
govern its own paramount role in interpreting and applying the first
amendment.197
The Court thus allowed "indecent" to be distinguished from "ob-
scene" by not requiring appeal to prurient interest as an element of inde-
cency. It therefore followed that the Carlin monologue was indecent
under section 1464, and the Court then turned to constitutional argu-
ments.198 The Court, however, declined to consider the overbreadth of
rial construed as a single offense signifying immorality relating to sexual impurity and not
encompassing merely coarse and vulgar language). See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 778 (Stewart, Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("indecent" under
§ 1464 properly should be read as meaning no more than "obscene").
Lower federal courts had reached similar conclusions. See United States v. Simpson,
561 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1977) (" 'obscene' and 'indecent' in § 1464 are to be read as part
of a single proscription"); see also Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 285-86 (7th
Cir. 1972) (section 1464 must be construed as harmonious with Roth to preserve its con-
stitutional validity); United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1972) (same);
Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966) (failure to define the word
"indecent" in § 1464 was reversible error); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093,
1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571) (approving jury instructions that essentially identified
"indecent" and "obscene").
Finally, at least two Commissioners had expressed grave doubts about the constitution-
ality of a standard as vague as "indecent" under § 1464. See WUHY-FM, E. Educ. Ra-
dio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 419 (1970) (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 422-25 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting); Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21
F.C.C.2d 833, 834 (1970) (Cox, Comm'r, dissenting); see also supra note 140.
197. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.). See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d 9, 20-21 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
The Court distinguished Hamling and the other substantial authority for equating "in-
decent" with "obscene" by finding them inapplicable to § 1464 because of the special
meaning the first amendment supposedly has in the broadcasting context. See Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 741-42 n.17. But the cases the Court cited for this proposition all relied
squarely on the perceived scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum as the basis for special
first amendment treatment of broadcasting. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 779-800 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
400 (1969). The scarcity rationale, however, not only is irrelevant to the issue of censor-
ship presented in Pacifica, but is antithetical to it. Scarcity and the concommitant need to
ensure diversity of expression support an end to FCC censorship and a multiplicity of all
types of expression on the airwaves, rather than censorship. See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 29
(Bazelon, C.L, concurring); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (1978) (Brennan,
Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Indeed, in their dissent Justices Brennan and Marshall decried
the majority's "acute ethnocentric myopia" that prevented it from appreciating the "cul-
tural pluralism" in this country, thereby allowing majoritarian tastes to silence diversity
of expression. See id at 775 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
The Court in Pacifica is commonly thought not to have relied on scarcity as a ration-
ale, which clearly would have been misplaced. See id at 770 n.4 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). In fact, however, the majority indirectly invoked that rationale at a critical
point in an inappropriate attempt to distinguish otherwise controlling precedent. See id.
at 741-42.
198. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742-51. Only Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
joined Justice Stevens' full discussion here. The remaining members of the majority, Jus-
tices Powell and Blackmun, concurred in the conclusion that the Commission's Order did
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section 1464 on its face, because as "indecency is largely a function of
context," it limited itself to reviewing the Commission's actions as to the
particular broadcast.199
Regarding the constitutionality of regulating nonobscene, indecent
broadcasting, Justice Stevens purported to narrow the issue to the facts
of the case. He then, however, framed the question in the broadest possi-
ble terms: "whether the First Amendment denies government any power
to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language in any circum-
stances. ' '2° As a result, he easily concluded that the Constitution man-
dates no such absolute prohibition and that, instead, the context of the
language is critical.2 °1
The context that Justice Stevens considered, however, was merely the
generalized one of broadcasting's perceived characteristics of unique per-
vasiveness and unique accessibility to children. Based on these considera-
tions, sketched in one paragraph each,202 Justice Stevens concluded that
broadcasting presents special first amendment problems that can be ad-
dressed by treating it differently than other media.203 This abbreviated
rationale was enough for Justices Powell and Blackmun to join the ma-
jority, holding that the Commission may constitutionally regulate inde-
cent, nonobscene broadcasting.2°
The Court thus not only wholly abdicated its proper role in statutory
and constitutional interpretation, it also failed to support its conclusions
with anything more than superficial analysis of the two basic rationales it
asserted. Moreover, although virtually apologetic in emphasizing that its
decision was confined to the facts and the program "as broadcast, ' 20 5 the
Court ignored or misstated factors that, according to its own analysis,
should have led to a different result.
With respect to the possible presence of children in the audience, the
Court made no attempt to define "children." The Court also did not
consider at what times any particular number of children might be listen-
ing and relate this factor to permissible FCC regulation.20 6 The Court,
not violate the first amendment but explicitly rejected Justice Stevens' reasoning. See id.
at 755-62.
199. See id. at 742; see also supra note 192.
200. Id. at 744 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens' apparent prediliction is shown by
his next sentence expressing his attitude toward the language in question: "For if the
government has any such power, this was an appropriate occasion for its exercise." Id.
201. See id. at 747-48.
202. Id. at 748-50.
203. See id. at 750.
204. See id. at 755-62 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., concurring). This concurrence expands
somewhat on Stevens' analysis of the uniqueness of broadcasting.
205. See id. at 734, 750; id. at 773 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The Court
stresses the narrowness of its holding in one way or another no less than five times. See
id. at 734-35, 738-39, 742, 744, 750.
206. Cf Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 19 n.2 (1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring),
rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Judge Leventhal, dissenting from the Court of Appeals opin-
ion, suggested that issue was not joined as to the Commission's determination that chil-
dren were undoubtedly in the audience when the Carlin monologue was broadcast. See
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for example, ignored that the broadcast took place at 2 P.M. on a school
day, when one reasonably might expect most children to be in school.2°7
Morever, while acknowledging the paramount interest of parents' claims
to authority in their own households,2"8 the Court did not distinguish
children's general access to radio and television from children's un-
supervised access, which was the only relevant question.' The Court
therefore failed to recognize that its decision denigrated rather than sup-
ported the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children by
supplanting parental discretion and authority with governmental fiat.210
Instead, the Court impliedly relied on the variable obscenity doctrine
in Ginsberg.21" ' Ginsberg, however, arose in the context of direct sale of
objectionable material to minors.2 12 Pacifica, conversely, dealt with a
general, undifferentiated distribution of material intended for adults that
could also be obtained by children.21 3 Justices Powell and Blackmun at
least tried to deal with this distinction, 214 but the plurality's opinion
glossed over it.215 Thus the Court concluded in a footnote, contrary to
common sense and long-standing principle, that the Commission's action
idl at 37 n.17 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). But the issue certainly went to the heart of the
vagueness and overbreadth of the Commission's Order, which was properly reviewable by
the Supreme Court on first amendment grounds. See id at 17, 19 n.2 (Bazelon, CJ.,
concurring).
Current statistics show that the percentage of children of ages two to eleven in the
television viewing audience has declined from 21% in 1970 to 14% in 1984. See A.C.
Nielsen Co., Nielsen Report on Television 4 (1985). For statistics of the days and hours
when teenagers and children are watching television, see id at 8-9. See infra note 324.
207. Compare Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 19 n.2 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (FCC's stan-
dards vaguely depend on when children may be in the audience) with id. at 37 n.17
(Leventhal, J., dissenting) (issue not joined as to FCC's finding that children were un-
doubtedly in the audience).
208. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
209. Compare id at 770 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (some parents might find
exposure of their children to the Carlin monologue both healthy and desirable) with
Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 34 n.6 (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (reference to the alleged prevalence
of "latchkey children" who often are home alone during the day).
210. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 769-70 (Brennan, Marshall, 33., dissenting).
211. See id. at 749-50; see also supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
212. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632-33, 671-72 (1968); see also supra
note 88.
213. The Court also ignored the fact that Ginsberg preceded Miller and that the Court
earlier had raised the question of what portion, if any, of Ginsberg had survived Miller.
See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975). The dissent in
Pacifica specifically raised this issue, see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 767-68 (Brennan, Marshall,
JJ., dissenting), that the majority ignored even in the face of a substantial argument that
the Miller standards incorporate the possibility of exposure to juveniles. See Pacifica, 556
F.2d at 28-29 n.30 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting
v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418 n.48, 420 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (statement of Bazelon, CJ.).
The problem deserved more careful treatment than the two sentences that the majority
used to invoke Ginsberg. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
214. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758-59 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
215. See id. at 749-50.
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would not "reduce adults to hearing only what is fit for children. '"216
The Court's discussion of the pervasiveness of radio, particularly in the
privacy of one's home, is equally deficient. The Court distinguished an
individual having to accommodate himself to public confrontation with
indecent, offensive material, and the intrusion of such material into his
home.217 But the Court never analyzed whether radio is more properly
considered an invader into the home or an invited guest. As the dissent
put it, an individual's decision to switch on and listen to public broad-
casting is a "decision to take part... in an ongoing public discourse. 218
Moreover, as the Court previously had noted, in contrast to other media
"[tjhe radio can be turned off."' 2 19 The substantial first amendment inter-
216. Id. at 750 n.28; see id. at 760-61 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., concurring). But see id.
at 768-69 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
The principle that government cannot reduce the adult population's first amendment
rights to those appropriate for children is set out in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383-84 (1957). See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983)
("[t]he level of discourse reaching [an adult's] mailbox simply cannot be limited to that
which would be suitable for a sandbox"); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297
(1978) (the community standard for judging obscenity should be restricted to adults and
not include children).
The Court's reliance on the availability of Carlin's message in other media for adults
who wish to hear it, see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n.28; id. at 760 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring), was also factually inaccurate, see id. at 774-75 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dis-
senting), and legally inappropriate. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 76-77 (198 1) (" '[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appro-
priate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place' ") (quot-
ing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). Accord Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (availability of alternative forum does not justify
restriction on use of a public forum); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1410 (9th Cir. 1985) ("an otherwise invalid restriction on pro-
tected activity is not saved by the availability of other means of expression"), affid on
narrower grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
217. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49; see also id. at 759 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., con-
curring).
Even so, the Court ignored that the issue of privacy in the home cuts both ways. On
the one hand, if one considers broadcast indecency as being thrust on unwilling and em-
barrassed recipients, then it seems particularly egregious that this offense occurs in the
home, where an individual should enjoy the greatest degree of privacy and serenity from
the outside world. On the other hand, the momentary offense and embarrassment might
be less because it occurs in the privacy of the home, rather than in public and in the
company of others. Some people who would be uncomfortable sitting through an "X"-
rated film in a theater might not hesitiate to watch it at home. Thus, the social setting in
which one encounters indecent language or pictures may have a considerable effect on
one's offense and embarrassment. If this is true, then the encounter in private, at home,
may be more tolerable than in public. See Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 107 n.8
(Robinson, Hooks, Comm'rs, concurring).
218. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 764-65 (1978) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ.
dissenting). See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S.
726 (1978); id. at 26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
219. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting Packer
Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)). The dissent, see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765-66
(Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting), and the court of appeals, see Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 17;
id. at 26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), made this point, thereby dispelling any notion of a
'captive audience' analysis applied to broadcasting. But see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 759
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ests at stake, therefore, easily should have outweighed the minimal incon-
venience in switching off a receiver or changing the station." ° This is
especially so because the problem of momentary discomfort from offen-
sive broadcast language can be further mitigated, as it was in Pacifica, by
a proper warning preceding the broadcast.221
(Powell, Blackmun, JJ. concurring) (adults should not be forced to absorb "first blow of
offensive" language in the home). Indeed one can imagine the scene in complainant's car.
As the first "dirty" word reached his-and his son's-ears, the dial could have been
turned in something approaching a nanosecond. Yet the complainant actually listened to
a substantial portion of the Carlin monologue. See Robinson, supra note 171 at 6 (parent
made no effort to turn off radio).
220. Because of the obvious self-help remedy available to an offended adult listener,
the Court focused on the problem of momentary offense to an unwilling listener. See
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. But the Court was implicitly inconsistent in two respects.
First, the Court several times stressed the repetition of the offensive language in Carlin's
monologue. See id at 729, 732, 739. The concurrence called it a "verbal shock treat-
ment." See id. at 757, 761 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., concurring). Although such repetition
might marginally increase the probability that a random scanner landing on station
WBAI would hear something that offended him, this probabilistic effect, which the Court
never delineated, is far too theoretical and inconsequential. Rather, the repetitive nature
of the monologue is irrelevant to the problem of momentary offense. The majority's em-
phasis of the repetition simply disguised its own value judgment of the material.
Second, the Court noted that a closed-circuit transmission might have required a differ-
ent result and acknowledged that "[t]he content of the program ... affect[s] the composi-
tion of the audience." Id at 750. The Court, nevertheless, ignored the facts before it
suggesting the likely nature of WBAI's audience. The broadcast was a serious adult pro-
gram, not one designed to attract children. Further, because Pacifica's stations are lis-
tener-supported, the bulk of their regular audience is composed of subscribers who know
and appreciate the sort of material that the stations broadcast. See supra note 127. Con-
sequently, their audience is highly non-random and, in fact, approximates that of a
closed-circuit transmission. Although these factors do not completely eliminate the possi-
bility of others, including children, tuning in, they probably largely explain why the New
York City broadcast elicited only a single complaint.
221. Justice Stevens dismissed as an inadequate remedy a listener's ability to turn off
offensive programming. He compared that argument to "saying that the remedy for an
assault is to run away after the first blow." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. But the similar
remedy of an unwilling viewer averting his eyes was central to the Court's decisions in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) and Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971). Moreover, Stevens' analogy entirely misses the point. There is
no first amendment protection for assault and battery. There is, however, such protection
for speech. It is precisely because we need to give speech far more breathing space than
action that the Court consistently has developed and applied, as a matter of constitutional
law, higher fault standards for speech torts than for other torts. See, eg., Hess v. Indi-
ana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (exhortations of violence cannot be punished unless
intended and likely to produce imminent disorder); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964) ("actual malice" standard for defamation of a public figure).
Justice Stevens also analogized that the ability to "hang up on an indecent phone call
... does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already
[occurred]." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. This comparison, however, fails to distinguish the
voluntary decision to engage in the impersonal, public discourse of broadcasting from the
substantially more intrusive nature of a private, unwanted telephone call initiated by an-
other party. The one-to-one nature of the phone call has far more potential to be offensive
and even threatening. The inappropriateness of Stevens' comparison is revealed by his
citation to the very different problem of harassing debt collection methods by telephone.
See id at 749 n.27.
A far more apt comparison is with the recent development of so-called "dial-a-porn."
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Instead of this sort of analysis, the Court cursorily relied on Rowan v.
United States Post Office, 222 for its pervasiveness/privacy argument. 223
The Court in Rowan upheld a federal statute allowing a householder to
require anyone who mails him advertisements for material the house-
holder deems erotically arousing or sexually provocative to remove his
name from mailing lists and cease all future mailings to the householder.
Construing the statute as vesting complete and unfettered discretion
solely in the addressee and thereby avoiding any semblance of govern-
mental censorship, the Court rejected a constitutional attack on the stat-
ute. In doing so, the Court specifically analogized to the right of a radio
or television viewer to twist the dial and thus stop an offensive or boring
communication.224 Rowan thus undercuts rather than supports Pacifica
because it affirms an individual homeowner's autonomy and exercise of
discretion, exemplified by his control over radio; it does not, however,
support any feature of government censorship.225
Finally, although the Court heavily emphasized the context of the pro-
gram "as broadcast, ' 226 it failed to consider it as heard. The complain-
ant listened to the program not in a home but in a car where an adult is
normally present and where the Court, in other contexts, consistently has
These telephone services, for a charge, provide the caller with a live or recorded explicit
description of actual or simulated sexual activity. The FCC has been attempting to re-
strict minors' access to such services either by limiting the hours of operation or requiring
prior payment for the calls by credit card. See Prohibitions Against the Transmission of
Obscene Material, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,348 (1983) (not. of inq.); Prohibitions Against the
Transmission of Obscene Material, 49 Fed. Reg. 2,124 (1984) (not. of inq. and proposed
rule); Common Carrier Transmission of Obscene Material, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 49
(1984), reconsid. denied, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 934 (1984). Displaying considerably
more sensitivity to the significant first amendment interests at stake than did the Supreme
Court in Pacifica, the Second Circuit voided the Commission's regulations. It reasoned
that the time-channeling provision was not the least restrictive means of achieving its
purpose. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter Carlin 1]. The Commission again tried unsuccessfully to develop constitu-
tional regulations. See Prohibitions Against the Transmission of Obscene Materials (sec-
ond notice of proposed rule), 50 Fed. Reg. 10,510 (1985) (Proposed Mar. 15, 1985);
Prohibitions Against the Transmission of Obscene Materials, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
225 (1985) (2d rep. & ord.) (requiring use of special access codes or prepayment by credit
card for dial-a-porn service), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Carlin Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Carlin I1] (Commission again
failed to consider available alternatives in New York Telephone Company territory). The
Commission has embarked on a "final trip around." See Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, (Current Service) Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 79:1, 79:8 n.15 (July 18, 1986). But
see Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352 (11 th
Cir. 1986) (phone company, a privately owned public utility, may deny access over its
non common carrier "Dial-It" services to a dial-a-porn provider to protect its corporate
image).
222. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
223. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 n.2.
224. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
225. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418 n.48
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 70 (1983).
226. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 735, 742 (1978).
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maintained that the expectation of privacy is considerably less than in the
home.227 Hence, the Court's decision led to an absurd conclusion. Com-
plainant and his son were entitled to be completely protected from even
momentary exposure to the Carlin monologue on the car radio; immedi-
ately changing stations or turning off the radio was not a sufficient rem-
edy. Yet, if they stopped in front of Cohen as he crossed the street
wearing his emblazoned jacket, or if they drove past Erznoznick's out-
door movie theater, the first amendment would demand that they just
avert their eyes or otherwise accommodate themselves to the unwanted
offense.228
Perhaps the unsupportable result in Pacifica was to be expected. The
case involved a sensitive topic, and was decided on the last day of the
term by a sharply divided Court faced with the hyperbolic specter of
what was about to invade living rooms across America. 9 There can be
little doubt, however, that the "Court's attempt to unstitch the warp and
woof of First Amendment law"230 richly deserves to be condemned and
discarded as a "derelict in the stream of the law."2'' To a good degree
227. See, eg., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (automobile search is an ex-
ception to fourth amendment warrant requirement); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153 (1925) (distinguishing search of house from search of vehicle).
228. The Court glossed over in footnotes this glaring contradiction between Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)
on the one hand, and Pacifica on the other. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25, 749 n.27;
cf id. at 759 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., concurring); id at 764-66 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
The Court's anomalous position is reminiscent of Justice Black's comment on the
Court's obscenity jurisprudence after it upheld, in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), the right to private possession and use of obscenity in the home while still in-
terdicting its importation and distribution for such purposes. See id. at 565-68. Justice
Black surmised that Stanley perhaps is "good law only when a man writes salacious
books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living room."
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). Accord United States v. 12 200-FL Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
229. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 744 n.19 (1978). The Commission played to
this fear by attaching to its petition for certiorari a copy of its recently issued Notice of
Apparent Liability to a university radio station, see Trustees of the Univ. of Pa. Radio
Station WXPN (FM), 57 F.C.C.2d 782 (1975), containing extended examples of broad-
casts of rather puerile and gross sexual material. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17,
Pacifica Found. v. F.C.C., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Pacifica countered by an addendum to its
brief listing many examples from great literary works such as the Bible, Chaucer, and
Shakespeare that could come within the FCC's definition of indecent and be banned from
broadcasting. See Brief for Pacifica Foundation, Addendum, Pacifica Found. v. FCC,
438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al., Amici
Curiae, Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Despite the Court's assertions to
the contrary, see supra note 192, and the limits it placed on its opinion, all concerned-
the Commission, Pacifica, amici and the Court itself-were clearly arguing about the
issue of indecency in broadcasting generally, not just a particular broadcast.
230. 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
231. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 68 (Supp. 1979) (citing North Dakota
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973)).
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this is what has happened.232 To the extent, however, that Pacifica leaves
open the door for the possible restriction of indecent though non-obscene
broadcasting, it leaves behind a troublesome legacy. Nowhere is this
more apparent than in current attempts to control indecency on cable.
II. THE CABLE INDECENCY CASES AND ASSERTED DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN CABLE AND BROADCASTING
It is not surprising that the increasing maturity of cable television has
spawned numerous disputes over allegedly indecent programming. The
232. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 0983). But see
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3117 n.13 (1984); New York v. Fer-
ber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 765 (1982).
Until very recently, the desuetude into which Pacifica has fallen was most evident at
the FCC. Contemporaneous with its initial consideration of Pacifica, the Commission
sanctioned a university radio station for obscene and indecent language in on-the-air con-
versations with listeners. See Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., Radio Station WXPN(FM), 57
F.C.C.2d 793 (1976) (designation of pub. hearing for lic. ren.). But immediately after the
Supreme Court announced its opinion in Pacifica, the Commission interpreted it as af-
fording the FCC "no general prerogative to intervene in any case where words similar or
identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast over a licensed radio or television station. We
intend strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding." WGBH Educ. Found.,
69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978) (mem. op. & ord.). Thereafter, the Commission consist-
ently maintained this position. See Dena Pictures, Inc., 98 F.C.C.2d 670, 670-71 (1984)
(Rev. Bd.); Kenneth L. Gilbert, 92 F.C.C.2d 126, 128 n.5 (1983) (Rev. Bd.) (lic. revoc.);
David Hildebrand, 92 F.C.C.2d 1241 (1983) (Rev. Bd.) (reversing prior license revoca-
tion); Decency in Broadcasting, Inc., 94 F.C.C.2d 1162 (1983) (mem. op. & ord.);
Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 759-61 (1983) (mem. op. & ord.).
An example of the Commission's general eschewing of any censorship role was its
recent refusal to designate programming issues as part of a comparative license renewal
hearing for a radio station despite the station's history of racial and anti-Semitic attacks.
See Cattle Country Broadcasting, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1109, 1112 (1985) ("It is well
settled that the Commission cannot use its regulatory power to rule material off the air
merely because the material may be offensive to many members of the broadcaster's audi-
ence."). Subsequently, however, the license was transferred to a competing applicant
pursuant to a settlement agreement. See Broadcasting, Sept. 8, 1986, at 129.
In a similar vein the Commission substantially narrowed its inquiry into the character
of its licensees and permit applicants. See Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licens-
ing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1279 (1986) (rep., ord., & policy stmt.), reconsid. denied, 61 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 619 (1986), pet. for rev. pending sub nom. National Ass'n for Better Broad-
casting v. FCC, No. 86-1179 (D.C. Cir. fied Mar. 17, 1986).
Currently in the indecency area, in Video 44, 102 F.C.C.2d 408, 411 (1985) (Rev. Bd.)
(mem. op. & order), a prima facie showing was made, under Miller and Illinois Citizens,
of obscene telecasts on subscription television service. On its own motion, however, the
Commission reversed this decision. It stated, "We believe that the Commission should
not attempt to determine in the first instance whether material is obscene, but rather,
should defer to local authorities." Video 44, 103 F.C.C.2d 1204, 1210 (1986) (mem. op.
& ord.). The Commission, however, soon began investigating three instances of allegedly
indecent radio broadcasts. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1986, at 11, col. 1. In this context
its new general counsel observed: "Any time we get into the First Amendment area, we
ought to proceed cautiously .... I don't think we should cast our net too wide." Broad-
casting, Jan. 5, 1987, at 64. Nevertheless, the Commission has just voted to vigorously
enforce the indecency standard established in Pacifica. This likely will lead to new court
challenges of the application of this standard. See FCC Acts to Restrict Indecent Pro-
gramming, N.Y. Times, April 17, 1987 at Al, col. 3.
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language problem of radio is compounded by the visual signal cable
brings into the home. In most cable communities, the service offers a
variety of sexually explicit material, including "R"-rated movies, sexu-
ally oriented shows on "adult" channels such as The Playboy Channel,
and similar programs on certain public access channels that often come
with the basic cable subscription.2 3 Moreover, the cable indecency issue
is arising in an atmosphere of generally heightened concern over alleged
pornography in all media.2 4 These factors have contributed to a prolif-
erating number of court battles over indecent cable programming.
233. See generally Weinstein, Sex and Cable, Cablevision, Feb. 11, 1985, at 28; Smith,
Battle Intensifying Over Explicit Sex on Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at AI, col
2; Landro, Public Access TV in New York Tends Toward Sex, Sadism, Wall St. J., Dec.
20, 1982, at 1, col. 4; Tell, Cable TV's Sex Problem, The Nat'l L., Feb. 15, 1982, at 1,
col. 2; Schwartz, The TV Pornography Boom, N.Y. Times Sept. 13, 1981, § 6 (Magazine),
at 44; TV Guide, Mar. 28, 1981, at 5.
These articles indicate that the nature of sexual cable programming varies considera-
bly. On one of the major premium movie channels, Home Box Office, about forty per
cent of the film schedule is "R"-rated. See Smith, Battle Intensifying Over Explicit Sex on
Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 2, at C22, col. 4 (citing president of
Home Box Office's Entertainment Division). Only a few cable systems in the country,
however, will show "X"-rated films. See id (citing National Cable Television Associa-
tion). Although apparently abandoning a recent attempt at a more mainstream program-
ming format, The Playboy Channel does not plan a "sex-on-demand" philosophy or the
showing of "X"-rated movies. See Motevalli, Playboy and the Erotica Dilemma, Cablevi-
sion, Dec. 15, 1986 at 24; Playboy Tries Revitalization, Broadcasting, Nov. 25, 1985, at
42, 43.
234. The concern often is expressed most vocally by groups such as Morality in Media
and Citizens for Decency Through Law. See Smith, Battle Intensifying Over Explicit Sex
on Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 2, C22, col. 5. Some, but not all,
feminist interests claim adverse effects from pornography. These groups have sought lo-
cal legislation to ban pornography as sexual subordination of, or discrimination against,
women. For discussions of this current controversy, see generally Emerson, Pornography
and the First Amendmen" A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 130
(1984); Hoffman, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497 (1985);
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985);
Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 Harv. J.L & Pub.
Pol'y, 461 (1986); Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 460 (1984); Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke LJ.
589. The first court to consider such an approach condemned as unconstitutional an
ordinance prohibiting pornography defined as the "graphic sexually explicit subordina-
tion of women." See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324, 328
(7th Cir. 1985) (the ordinance is "thought control"), affid mem., 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
Further indicative of the general trend is the recently released Final Report of the
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. See U.S. Dep't of Justice Att'y Gen.'s
Comm'n on Pornography, Final Report (1986) [hereinafter Final Report]. Cf Lynn,
"Civil Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission: New Developments in
Pornography Regulation, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 27 (1986); ACLU, Polluting the
Censorship Debate: A Summary and Critique of the Final Report of the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography, Public Policy Report, July 1986. The proliferation of video-
cassette rental stores also has led to local crackdowns on distribution of sexually explicit
movies. See Lindsey, Outlets That Offer Explicit Sex Tapes Facing Prosecution, N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1985, at Al, col. 1; see also Adams, Hometown Porn Wars Escalating,
Nat'l L.J., July 28, 1986, at 1, col 4. And the record industry now has been intimidated
into including advisory labels on album and cassette covers identifying recordings that
contain supposedly offensive lyrics. See Broadcasting, Nov. 4, 1985, at 97; Congress All
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A. The Cable Indecency Cases
Cable operators generally function under a municipal franchise
awarded through a competitive bidding process. Consequently, efforts to
restrict indecency on cable usually involve prohibitory local ordinances
or contractual provisions in the franchise agreement, sometimes backed
by similar state statutes.235 This regulatory scheme puts the cable opera-
tor in the difficult position of acceding to the restrictions or risking his
franchise. Although operators have not always been at the forefront of
challenges to this content control, a number have attacked such restric-
tions. These cases unfortunately set the tone for differentiating between
cable and broadcasting. One such case, however, Home Box Office v.
Wilkinson,236 is an exception. The remarkable simplicity of the court's
analysis demonstrates the feasibility of an alternative approach.
In Home Box Office, cable telvision distributors and franchisees chal-
lenged, on its face, a 1981 Utah statute making it a crime to" 'knowingly
distribute by wire or cable any pornographic or indecent material.' ,237
In holding the statute unconstitutional, the district court only considered
whether Utah's attempt to proscribe indecent cable programming went
beyond the obscenity boundaries established in Miller. The court did not
consider the specific medium of cable, its accessibility in the home, or the
potential for children in the audience.238 Indeed, although the state re-
lied on Pacifica, the court ignored it. Instead, it strongly indicated that
there is no legal distinction between broadcast and cable television or
239other video media that is relevant to control of indecent programming.Rather the court simply concluded that the statute exceeded the Miller
Shook Up Over Rock Lyrics, Broadcasting, Sept. 23, 1985, at 28; Holden, Recordings Will
Carry Advisory Lyrics, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1985, at 17, col. 5.
The citizens of Maine, however, recently defeated, by a more than 2 to 1 margin, a
referendum to make selling or promoting obscene material illegal. See Wald, Maine Anti-
Obscenity Plan Soundly Defeated, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at 17, col. 1. And the
Oregon Supreme Court has just virtually eliminated all obscenity prosecutions in that
state. See State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 525, 732 P.2d 9, 17-18 (1987).
235. For a description of federal regulation in this area under the 1984 Cable Act, 47
U.S.C. § 529-559 (Supp. III 1985), see infra notes 261-82 and accompanying text.
236. 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982).
237. See id. at 989 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981)). The
terms "pornographic" and "indecent" were defined in related statutes. Id. at 989-90.
238. The court ruled simply: "States may not go beyond Miller in prescribing criminal
penalties for distribution of sexually oriented material. For better or worse, Miller estab-
lishes the analytical boundary of permissible state involvement in the decision by HBO
and others to offer, and the decision by subscribers to receive, particular cable TV pro-
gramming." Id. at 994-95 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
239. Construing the statute as possibly criminalizing the presentation over cable of
"R"-rated, Academy Award-Winning films that could be exhibited, without violating the
statute, in theaters, on broadcast TV, or on videotape or videodisc in the home, the court
rhetorically asked, "[W]hat is the rational basis for discriminating against one technol-
ogy?" Id. at 996 n.18.
In a later passage, without distinguishing broadcasting from cable, the court stated that
the transmission and delivery of nonobscene TV programming could not be prohibited by
a statute going beyond the Miller standard. See id. at 997.
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boundaries, was overbroad, and did not admit a narrower constitutional
construction.24°
A few months later, however, a very similar issue involving a city ordi-
nance was again before the same court. This time, although it reached
the same result, the court significantly altered its analysis by launching
into a comparison of broadcasting and cable.241 The city analogized its
regulatory power to that of the FCC and relied on Pacifica. The court,
however, found Pacifica inapplicable. It noted the "important respects"
in which the characteristics of cable and broadcast television differ:
242
Cable
1. User needs to subscribe.
2. User holds power to cancel
subscriptions.
3. Limited advertising.
4. Transmittal through wires.
5. User receives signal on
private cable.
6. User pays a fee.
7. User receives preview of
coming attractions.
8. Distributors or distributee
may add services and expanded
spectrum of signals or channels
and choices.
9. Wires are privately owned.
Broadcast
User need not subscribe.
User holds no power to cancel.
May complain to F.C.C.,




User appropriates signal from
the public airwaves.
User does not pay a fee.
User receives daily and weekly
listing in public press or
commercial guides.
Neither distributor nor
distributee may add services,
signals or choices.
Airwaves are not privately
owned but are publicly
controlled.
The district court characterized these purported distinctions as reflec-
tions of the "[l]evels and degrees of choice" available with cable but not
broadcasting.243 At a primary level, the contractual choices cable offers
include: whether to subscribe initially, which cable services to accept,
and whether to continue the subscription. 2' On a secondary level, a
cable viewer may choose among a larger number of channels and sub-
jects.245 At both levels, the court found broadcast viewers far more con-
strained, largely because the number of broadcasters is limited and they
240. See id at 999.
241. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 CD.
Utah 1982).
242. Id The Supreme Court in Pacifica suggested possible differences among "radio,
television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 750 (1978). Unfortunately, this suggestion fosters attempts to liken cable to closed-
circuit transmissions and thus distinguish it from broadcasting.
243. See Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1170.




must operate within the public interest standard.24 6
The court also distinguished broadcasting and cable by literally and
physically applying the Pacifica pervasiveness rationale.247 On the other
hand, the court could perceive no basis for treating a form of communi-
cation differently simply because it is pervasive in the sense of being re-
ceived in the home.248
In short, the court found only Miller and not Pacifica relevant. But
the district court's superficial analysis of the differences between cable
and broadcasting soon was adopted wholesale by other courts. It has
become virtually the "law of the case" in cable indecency matters. In
Cruz v. Ferre,249 for example, the court repeated almost verbatim the
above list of distinctions and stressed that a cable subscriber ostensibly
has greater viewing control than his broadcast counterpart.2 ° Such con-
trol includes a cable subscriber's decision whether or not to bring cable
into his home, his ability to avoid surprise in programming by consulting
monthly viewing guides, and his ability to protect immature viewers,
such as children, from unsuitable programming by the use of parental
lockboxes available free from the cable operator. The latter, in particular,
was for the court the "death-knell" of Pacifica's applicablility to cable.2 '
On appeal plaintiffs and amici continued to stress the asserted factual
distinctions between cable and broadcasting.25 2 The Eleventh Circuit,
relying on this means of rendering Pacifica inapplicable, affirmed.253
When the issue resurfaced once more in Utah,254 another district court
246. See id. at 1168-69.
247. Thus, the court perceived a difference between broadcasting's electromagnetic
waves indiscriminately diffused through the "ether," and cable signals transmitted only
by invitation through wires. Id. at 1169. For a discussion of the inaccuracy of the term
"ether," see infra note 310.
248. As the Court stated:
The Court finds great difficulty in distinguishing (other than the popcorn)
between going to the movies at a theater and having the movies come to me in
my home through electronic transmission over wire. The choice is mine. The
location is different. The content is the same. Why should the non-'indecent'
on Main Street be transmuted by ordinance and municipal definition into 'inde-
cency' in my home?
Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1170.
249. 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983), afid, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
250. See id. at 132.
251. See id.
252. Brief for Appellee Home Box Office, Inc. at 3, 10 n.1, 12-13, 27-30, 35-36, Cruz v.
Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5588); Brief for Amicus Curiae National
Cable Television Ass'n, Inc., at 2-3, 4 n.1, 12-17, Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11 th Cir.
1985) (No. 83-5588); Brief of Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., at 12-15,
Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5588).
253. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1415 (11th Cir. 1985). At least one plaintiff was
subsequently awarded attorneys' fees. See Broadcasting, Sept. 15, 1986, at 120.
254. The Utah Legislature passed, over the Governor's veto, a new act to control cable
indecency. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1701 to 1708 (Supp. 1986). The state con-
strued it as mere time, place, and manner regulation rather than prohibition. See Formal
Op. No. 83-001, Att'y Gen. of Utah 1, 4-5 (1983). In his veto message, the Governor
noted that none of the channels showing "blue" movies or the like were operating in
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found inapposite the Pacifica rationales of pervasiveness and accessibility
to children.255 The court relied on the same perceived factual distinc-
tions asserted in the previous Utah cases and in Cruz. It concluded that
cable is not an uninvited intruder into the home "but an invitee whose
invitation can be carefully circumscribed."25 6 This factor, therefore, ac-
comodates parental concern for children.
The issue of cable indecency is not likely to be settled soon. 7 Indeed,
the appearance in 1982 of The Playboy Channel on cable systems nation-
wide has fanned the controversy.25 Thus, although courts so far have
Utah. He also cited the differences between cable and broadcasting and the greater con-
trol cable viewers are assumed to have. Letter to Lt. Governor Monson from Governor
Matheson, Mar. 30, 1983, Utah S. Journal, Veto Override Session, 1117, 1119-20 (Apr.
20, 1983).
Public sentiment in Utah was reflected in the subsequent electoral defeat, by a margin
of 61% to 39%, of a proposed state criminal law controlling cable programming. See
Cablevision, Nov. 19, 1984, at 18.
255. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1113-16 (D. Utah
1985), aft'dper curiam sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd
mem., 55 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1987) (No. 86-1125). The Tenth Circuit's brief
opinion relies almost entirely on the reasoning of the lower court. A lengthy concur-
rence, however, while agreeing that the Utah law is unconstitutional, finds cable stffi-
ciently similar to broadcasting to be subject to Pacifica type regulation. See Jones, 800
F.2d at 993, 1004-07 (Baldock, J., specially concurring).
256. Community Television, 611 F. Supp. at 1113.
257. Despite considerable expense, the State of Utah pursued the matter to the
Supreme Court. See Utah Seeks Supreme Court Review of Cable Programming Case,
Broadcasting, Jan. 12, 1987, at 149; Broadcasting, Apr. 22, 1985, at 10. The Court's
summary affirmance, see Wilkinson v. Jones, 55 U.S.L.W. 3643 (Mar. 23, 1987) (No. 86-
1125), is binding precedent for lower courts. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45
(1975). It does not, however, have the same authority before the Supreme Court as a
written opinion rendered after plenary consideration. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981). Moreover, a summary affirmance represents the Supreme
Court's approval of the judgment below but does not necessarily adopt the lower court's
reasoning. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam). See Hardwick v.
Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1207-10 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 n.4 (1986);
cf Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391, rehearing denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir.
1984). See generally H. Hart & H. Weschler, The Federal Courts and The Federal Sys-
tem 160-63 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
At any rate, other states repeatedly have tried to restrict cable indecency through vari-
ous legislative approaches, and these efforts undoubtedly will continue. See Wolfe, Flor-
ida Systems Prepare to Fight 'Obscenity' Ban, Cablevision, Jan. 20, 1986, at 23; see also
McGhee v. Village of Vernon Hills, No. 83 C 2486 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1985) (Kocoras,
J.) (agreement between cable operator and village to ban "X"-rated films successfully
challenged); Gates v. Ney, F.2d, at No. 85-3110 slip op. (6th Cir. 1986) (plea bargain by
indicted cable operator, who agreed not to show "X"-rated material or the equivalent,
challenged by cable subscriber but upheld by Sixth Circuit interpreting agreement to
reach only obscene material). And the FCC has just reinvigorated its efforts to control
indecency. See supra note 232.
258. As of November, 1986, The Playboy Channel reached about 600,000 subscribers
on 596 systems, a 16.7% reduction over the previous year. See Cable Programming Sta-
tus Report, Broadcasting, Dec. 1, 1986, at 66. For a description of the controversy, see
Shenon, Ban in Buffalo of Playboy TVis Sought, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1984, at B1, col. 4;
Adams, Hometown Porn Wars Escalating, Nat'l L.J., July 28, 1986, at 1, ol. 4. See also
Wolfe, Cox Operator Drops Playboy Channel in Face of Obscenity Indictiments, Cablevi-
sion, Mar. 4, 1985, at 16 (indicted cable operator dropped The Playboy Channel because
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kept cable free of indecency controls-albeit, as will soon be argued, for
the wrong reasons-cable clearly remains vulnerable to this sort of cen-
sorship. z5 9 Unlike the FCC's actions against broadcasters, however, ma-
jor communications interests have been at the center of the cable
indecency controversy and most likely will remain there.
B. Indecency Provisions of the 1984 Cable Act
Congress, moreover, has assured that cable indecency issues will con-
tinue to proliferate by addressing the matter in several unclear and con-
fusing provisions of the 1984 Cable Act.260  To the extent these
provisions preclude or chill constitutionally protected expression, they
conflict with one of the basic purposes of the Act: to assure and en-
courage the "widest possible diversity" of cable programming. 261
The most general obscenity provision of the Act is section 559, which
imposes a fine or imprisonment for the transmission by cable of matter
that is "obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution. ' 262
Although this provision apparently is intended to be the cable analogue
of threat of "prolonged and expensive litigation"). But see Cablevision, Aug. 26, 1985, at
20 (Oklahoma grand jury refused to indict cable operator for carrying The Playboy
Channel).
259. Although the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography was sharply di-
vided on the issue of statutory regulation of indecent films on cable, see Final Report,
supra note 234, at 398-400, a number of its recommendations advocate stricter control
over allegedly obscene cable programming. See id. at 483-85, 520-23, 530-31, 573-82.
260. The 1984 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C §§ 521 et seq. (Supp. III 1985), is the first direct
congressional grant of authority to the FCC to regulate cable. It represents a trade-off by
the cable industry of some journalistic freedoms for economic benefits. See Goodale, Is
the New Cable Law a Disappearing Act?, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1, at 32
("some members of the industry... trade[d] their First Amendment position and any
deregualtory power held by the FCC in exchange for rate deregulation and certainty of
license renewal"); FCC Starts Action on Revising Cable Rules, Broadcasting, Dec. 10,
1984, at 93, 94 (quoting FCC Chairman Fowler and FCC Mass Media Bureau Chief
McKinney). Brenner & Price, The 1984 Cable Act: Prologue and Precedents, 4 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 19 (1985) (analyzing the Cable Act of 1984); Meyerson, The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 Ga. L.
Rev. 543 (1985) (same).
261. See 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (Supp. III 1985); see also id. § 532(a), 532(e) (3), 532(g)
(other provisions discussing policy of encouraging diverse information sources); H.R.
Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, 4655, 4656 (these provisions provide for widest possible diversity of infor-
mation services and sources) [hereinafter House Report]. The actual language of § 521(4)
refers to the widest possible diversity of "information sources" and this could have a
somewhat different meaning than diversity of programming. See Meyerson, supra note
260, at 590.
262. See 47 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. III 1985). Because of this provision, the FCC deleted
its rule, 47 C.F.R. § 76.215 (1986), prohibiting obscene or indecent material on "origina-
tion cablecasting" channels. See Amendment of Commission's Rules to Implement Pro-
visions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1, 37-
38 (1985) (deleting 47 C.F.R. § 76.215 (1986)). "Origination cablecasting" referred to
cable programming, other than broadcast signals, subject to the "exclusive control" of
the cable operator. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(w) (1986).
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of section 1464,263 it replaces "obscene, indecent or profane" with the
equally vague "obscene or otherwise unprotected." This same phrase is
repeated in section 544(d)(1), which allows a franchising authority and a
cable operator to specify in their agreement that obscene or otherwise
unprotected cable services "shall not be provided or shall be provided
subject to conditions.""26 The legislative history of section 544(d) ex-
pressly adopts the Supreme Court's Miller obscenity criteria. It never-
theless indicates that franchising authorities can apply local community
standards, even though section 559 appears national in scope and much
cable programming is distributed nationally.265 The history also makes
clear that the phrase "otherwise unprotected" expression encompasses
"changing constitutional interpretations" that incorporate, for example,
indecency standards.266
Sections 559 and 554(d)(1), which apply to cable services generally,
are complicated by a different provision governing commercial leased ac-
cess channels required under section 532.267 Because a cable operator is
forbidden to exercise any editorial control over such channels,268 he is
shielded from criminal or civil liability for programming carried on
them.269 A similar rule, in section 531, applies to access channels avail-
able for public, educational, and governmental ("PEG") uses.27° Section
263. See 130 Cong. Rec. H12,243 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
264. See 47 U.S.C. § 544(d) (1) (Supp. III 1985). Such a provision might be necessary
to reserve a role for the franchising authority because the Act, otherwise, generally
preempts any inconsistent state or local provision. See id §§ 544(a)-(f), 556(c). But see
ia § 558 (discussed infra note 277).
265. See House Report, supra note 261, at 4706. However, the legislative history of the
cognate provision of the Senate predecessor of the Act, S. 66, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 607
(1983), seems to adopt a different approach:
This provision of the bill is not intended to permit municipal officials or cable
operators to substitute their own concepts of obscene or unprotected speech for
judicially determined standards. Nor does it permit the imposition of sanctions
or the determination of a breach of the franchise in the absence of a judicial
determination that particular speech was obscene or otherwise unprotected by
the Constitution.
S. Rep. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983).
None of the legislative history, however, addresses the intriguing question of what con-
ditions can or should be imposed on the presentation of obscene or otherwise unprotected
programming by § 544(d)(1); nor does it explain how such conditions apply to material
that actually is obscene.
266. See House Report, supra note 261, at 4706-07. The Report specifically refers to
Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983), Community Television of Utah, Inc. v.
Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982), and Home Box Office v. Wilkinson, 531 F.
Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982). See House Report, supra note 261, at 4707. The Report also
incorporates as unprotected expression "fighting words" and speech presenting a "clear
and present danger" to public order. See id. at 4706.
267. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. III 1985).
268. See id § 532(c)(2). A cable operator may consider the content of programming
on such channels only to establish a reasonable price for its use. See id; House Report,
supra note 261, at 4688-89.
269. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985). See House Report, supra note 261, at 4732.
270. See 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (Supp. III 1985). This section precludes a cable operator's
editorial control over such channels, and § 558 shields him from liability. Section 531(e),
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532(h), however, restricts use of a leased access channel by a cable ser-
vice that "in the judgment of the franchising authority is obscene, or is in
conflict with community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution.",27' There is no
indication of what this amorphous language means, why it expands on
the "obscene or otherwise unprotected" formulation of sections 559 and
554(d)(1), or why sole discretion apparently is vested in the franchising
authority.2 72 Unless it is narrowly interpreted, this provision is of doubt-
ful validity, particularly because it seems to endorse prior restraint with
no procedure for prompt judicial review.2 73 Its practical effect, however,
is to create considerable difficulties and uncertainties for those wishing to
use the access channels, though not necessarily for the shielded cable
operator. Indeed, to the extent an operator can, he has a distinct advan-
tage in keeping questionable material on the access channels, because he
is not liable for programming on those channels.274
Finally, section 558 provides that the Act is not to be construed to
affect criminal or civil liability under federal, state or local laws regard-
ing "libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of privacy, false or
misleading advertising, or other similar laws."'2 "1 There is no indication
of the relationship between this section and the other obscenity/inde-
cency restrictions.
By this jumble of provisions Congress apparently sought two goals.
First, it attempted to prohibit both obscenity and indecency on cable to
the extent constitutionally permissible; that is, to the extent indecency is
held "otherwise unprotected" under changing constitutional interpreta-
tions.276 Second, it tried to avoid preemption and preserve a role for state
however, is subject to § 544(d), which allows a franchise agreement to exclude or condi-
tion the showing of obscene or otherwise unprotected material. But it does not indicate
how that agreement between the cable operator and franchising authority affects the third
party user of a PEG channel.
271. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. 111 1985).
272. The brief legislative history on this point uses only the "obscene or otherwise...
unprotected" language and describes § 532 (h) as expressly adopting the Supreme Court's
resort to local community standards. See House Report, supra note 261, at 4692. Be-
cause § 532(h) provides that the proscribed programming shall not be provided, or shall
be provided only subject to conditions, it raises the same questions as to the imposition of
conditions as § 544(d) (1) raises. See supra note 265.
273. See S. Rep. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 25.
274. The Act, however, tries to prevent operators from defeating the purpose of leased
access channels by simply moving to these channels programming that is already on oper-
ator-controlled channels. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(c) (3) (Supp. III 1985); see also House
Report, supra note 261, at 4691-92; 130 Cong. Rec. at S14,289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984)
(App. B).
275. See 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985); see also House Report, supra note 261, at
4732
276. For example, in a colloquy inserted into the Congressional Record, Senator Gold-
water, who introduced the Senate predecessor of the Act, said that the "other similar
laws" language in 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985) covers constitutionally sound inde-
cency laws. 130 Cong. Rec. S14,289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Goldwater).
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and local control, as well as for FCC regulations and other federal en-
forcement.277 In addition to spawning confusion and uncertainty, how-
ever, Congress may have frustrated its own purposes. The only court, so
far, to consider a state statute directed against cable indecency in light of
the new Act held that the Act preempted the statute.278 The court found
that the statute conflicted with the special provisions of sections 531 and
532, and that section 558 covers laws regulating obscenity, but not
indecency.
279
In addition to these clumsy attempts, Congress adopted in section
544(d)(2)(A) a relatively straightforward approach that should govern
the issue of indecency on television. 2 0 This provision requires cable op-
erators to sell or lease to their subscribers, upon request, a lock-box de-
vice to restrict children's access to certain cable programming.28 ' In
implementing this program the FCC sensibly stated: "[W]e believe that
the provision for lockboxes largely disposes of issues involving the Com-
mission's standard for indecency and would also be a significant factor in
cases related to obscenity and similar offensive programming. 282 Be-
cause, as explained in the next section, similar broadcast technology ex-
ists, the same approach should be applied to broadcasting as well.
With the unabating trends in the cable indecency area now com-
pounded by chaotic federal legislation, however, courts will almost cer-
tainly continue to assert differences between broadcasting and cable to
evade Pacifica's strictures. We therefore now consider why these distinc-
tions are unconvincing and even damaging to expanded first amendment
freedom for both cable and broadcasting.
III. THE SIMILARITY OF BROADCASTING AND CABLE
The asserted distinctions between cable and broadcasting may have
277. Senator Goldwater also made it clear that § 558 directly addressed the Supreme
Court's preemption decision in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984),
and was designed to maintain state and local authority in this area. 130 Cong. Rec.
S14,289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
278. See Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1102-06 (D.
Utah 1985), affidper curiam sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986),
aff'd mem., 55 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1987) (No. 86-1125).
279. See id. The court, however, found simply that §§ 531 and 532 authorize more
limited state or local regulation of access channels than Utah's broad statutory approach.
The court distinguished the inserted Goldwater colloquy, see supra notes 276-77, and
relied instead on the "official" legislative history. See Community Television, 611 F.
Supp. at 1104-06.
280. See 47 U.S.C. § 544(d) (2) (A) (Supp. II 1985).
281. See id Congress specifically cited such devices as one means of limiting exposure
of children to such material. See House Report, supra note 261, at 4707.
282. Amendment to Rules Under the 1984 Cable Communications Act, 58 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1, 36 (1985) (citation omitted). The Commission's lock-box requirements,
however, apply only to channels over which a cable operator has editorial control. By
thus excluding commercial access, PEG, and must-carry channels, the requirements ar-




some superficial appeal, but they are not constitutionally significant.
This is true at three levels of analysis: a) the asserted factual differences
between the media; b) the purported uniqueness of broadcasting thought
to follow from these factors; and c) the societal justifications for control-
ling television program content.
A. The Factual Elements
The factual distinctions between broadcasting and cable fall generally
into three non-exclusive categories: i) the physical characteristics of each
medium; ii) the choices each medium affords the viewer; and iii) the na-
ture and degree of control a viewer has over each medium.283 None of
the asserted distinctions, however, is sufficient to justify different first
amendment treatment.
1. Physical Characteristics
Both cable and broadcast programming are distributed by the same
physical phenomenon, electromagnetic radiation. Cable signals are
transmitted over wires, while broadcasts are transmitted through space.
But neither method is more in the public domain than the other. Indeed,
the notion of public ownership of the broadcast airwaves is misguided.2 84
283. In the cable indecency cases, courts also have noted that broadcast television has
more advertising. These courts have not, however, explained how this is significant, even
if accurate. See supra text accompanying note 242. Presumably, such courts reason that
advertisers exert some control over offensive programming in order not to offend poten-
tial customers. This rationale is dubious, at best. Even sex-oriented programming like
Midnite Blues, on Manhattan Cable's public access channel, attracts advertisers such as
escort services, sex clubs, and videocassette stores that seek a particular audience. More-
over, although pay cable lacks the usual television advertising, the programming is the
product sold. Consequently, the programming itself is subject to competitive and com-
mercial pressures similar to those exerted on sponsored programming. Finally, even if
there were more advertising on broadcast television, the courts' reasoning would support
greater freedom from governmental content control for broadcasting, not cable.
284. Although property rights in the use of a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum
can and should be protected, the concept of spectrum ownership is, strictly speaking,
meaningless. Electromagnetism is simply one of the four fundamental forces of nature,
the others being gravity and the "strong" and "weak" nuclear forces. The electromag-
netic spectrum, therefore, cannot be owned, publicly or privately, any more than gravity
can be owned. No one, for example, would be likely to justify a government tax on
automobiles for the privilege of keeping a car "on" the road as a gravity use tax based on
the government's ownership of gravity. This analogy is increasingly compelling as mod-
em physics moves to unify the four fundamental forces under one theory. See, e.g.,
Quigg, Elementary Particles and Forces, Scientific American, April 1985, at 84.
Similarly, property interests in another form of electromagnetic radiation, sunlight in-
cident on one's real property, are limited to the right to use the light without interference,
but are not based on ownership of the sunlight itself. See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis.
2d 223, 233-34, 321 N.W.2d 182, 188 (1982); see also Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 Minn. L.
Rev. 67, 152 (1967) (public ownership of the broadcast spectrum is logically meaning-
less).
The electromagnetic spectrum, therefore, is not a "natural resource" subject to owner-
ship. Indeed, one could say that it does not exist independently of specific transmitters
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It simply states the conclusion that broadcasting should be subject to
government regulation, which needs independent justification to be valid.
Applying the same forced rationale, the government could also regulate
cable programming because cable wires must use public rights-of-way.285
Moreover, the bulk of programming distributed by cable operators is
produced by others and transmitted to the operator's headend by satellite
transmission or land-based microwave relay stations. 86 It is then redis-
tributed to subscribers via cable. The entire distribution network for
most cable programming, therefore, heavily depends on the use of the
same "public" airwaves as broadcasting. This global view of cable pro-
gramming distribution might shift the focus for regulation from state or
local government to the FCC.287 Nevertheless, such programming
would still be as vulnerable to regulation as broadcasting.
2. Nature and Degree of Viewer Choice
The case for distinguishing cable from broadcasting is only slightly
stronger with regard to the choices that viewers of each medium have.
The standard argument is that a cable viewer must choose to subscribe to
a cable system, undergo the initial equipment installation, pay originally
for the service and continue paying a periodic subscription fee. More-
over, a cable subscriber often may choose additional specialty channels.
In particular, the subscriber must specifically order and pay additional
fees to receive selected premium programming such as movie or adult
channels, which often are at the heart of the indecency controversy. Fi-
nally, the subscription to any particular channel, or indeed the entire
cable service, can be cancelled at any time. The argument is that, by
providing these choices, cable becomes more like a "guest" invited into
the home rather than the "intruder" broadcasting is said to be.
As long as individuals have free will and television sets are equipped
with on/off buttons and channel selectors, however, these asserted differ-
ences of choice are ephemeral. The only significant choice with respect
to both cable and broadcast programming is whether to watch. This
and receivers. For a more technical discussion, see Mueller, Property Rights in Radio
Communication: The Key to the Reform of Telecommunications Regulation, 11 Cato In-
stitute Policy Analysis, 6-9 (1982).
285. Such a conclusion could lead to the anomalous result that material could be con-
stitutionally banned from a local cable system but nonetheless could be viewed on the
same televisions with videocassette recorders. The length of the cable between the
machine playing the tape and the machine displaying the image would be of constitu-
tional dimension. Cf supra note 248.
286. See C. Ferris, F. Lloyd, & J. Casey supra note 168, 1 25.02, at 25-3. In particular,
national programming on the premium movie and adult channels, the common targets of
allegations of indecency, is distributed this way. Material on local access channels, how-
ever, may originate at the cable headend.
287. Indeed, state or local regulation may be federally preempted. See supra notes 6-7,
277-79 and accompanying text. But see Video 44, 103 F.C.C.2d 1204, 1210 (1986) (mem.




choice is equally available in each medium. The initial choice is whether
to own a television receiver; whether one connects it to a cable, to a dish
antenna for direct receipt of satellite transmissions, or to a standard roof-
top antenna for traditional broadcast reception is of little consequence.
In each case, one must pay for the necessary equipment; differences in
the economics of this payment do not produce different viewing choices.
In each case, failure to pay either an initial amount or a periodic pay-
ment, as a cable subscription payment or an installment payment for tele-
vision equipment, has the same result of "choosing" not to watch. After
making the payments, however, turning on the set is equally an invitation
into the home to broadcasting and to cable. Thus, perceived differences
in the effort or deliberateness of choosing to watch cable over broadcast-
ing are largely vacuous and irrelevant to the indecency controversy be-
cause the deliberateness and effort in choosing not to watch either are the
same.
Finally, although a cable subscriber has more channels and therefore
more choices, this numerical superiority by itself is irrelevant to deciding
whether any of those channels should be subject to content control. In
fact, if one believes that, in this sense, broadcasting is a scarcer medium
than cable, broadcasting should be entitled to more, not less, protection
from indecency regulation than cable to ensure diversity of
programming.188
3. Nature and Degree of Viewer Control
The differences between broadcasting and cable seem most apparent
with regard to viewer control. Many cable channels are devoted to spe-
cial formats that appeal to specific groups of viewers. This "narrowcast-
ing" feature largely allows a subscriber to exclude certain programming
formats simply by not subscribing to the corresponding channels or to a
tier of services including those channels.289 For several reasons, how-
ever, the exclusion of indecent or otherwise objectionable cable program-
ming is not so simple.
First, although cable operators use converters and scramblers to pre-
vent normal reception of premium channels by cable subscribers who
have not ordered and paid for them, these devices may not adequately
screen out offensive material. 9 ° Such problems presumably could be
288. See supra note 197.
289. To the extent, however, that a cable system offers some basic or premium chan-
nels only in fixed tiers, a subscriber is precluded from perfect, channel-by-channel
discrimination.
290. On many systems, for example, only the video portion of the signal is scrambled.
Therefore, a subscriber to the basic tier of such a system could tune in to a televised
performance of the Carlin monologue, see supra note 170 and accompanying text, on a
pay channel with Carlin's physical features distorted but his voice clear and discernible.
Movie dialogue with similar language also would be available. Moreover, even scrambled
video of adult programming with discernible nude bodies and depictions of sexual activity
may be too offensive for some.
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solved by refined technology, but there are more fundamental limits to
the advantages of narrowcasting. Arguably indecent programming is not
confined to a few identifiable premium channels and can be eliminated
entirely only by removing the television set. The public and leased access
channels29 1 may also be a fertile source of indecency, even on the basic
tier of service.29 2 More generally, even those who willingly subscribe to a
premium channel to enjoy major, family-oriented movies in their homes
will also find a number of adult or "R"-rated movies on the same chan-
nel.293 Indeed, any channel that shows current movies or serious, mature
programming also may include "indecent" material.
Viewer guides, available for most cable channels, are frequently cited
as a way to avoid unpleasant surprise from unwanted program content.
These often provide a short description of scheduled programming, give
the MPAA rating for movies, and indicate potentially offensive language,
291. Most cable systems are required to provide such public and leased access channels
free of the operator's editorial control. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
292. See Public Access TV in New York Tends Toward Sex, Sadism, Wall St. J., Dec.
20, 1982, at 1, col. 4.; Schwartz, The TVPornography Boom, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1981,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 129-30. Real "indecency" in the form of racism and anti-semitism also
is finding an outlet on cable access channels. See Extremist Finds Cable TVIs Forum for
Right Wing Views, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1986, at A23, col. 1.
The 1984 Cable Act does not specifically require that either PEG or leased access
channels be provided on the basic tier, but many local franchise agreements do. One
could also argue that this is implicit in the Act. See Meyerson, supra note 260, at 589,
597-98 & n.322; see also Amendment to Rules Implementing 1984 Cable Act, 60 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 514, 522-23 (1986) (maintaining definition of "basic cable service" for
purposes of rate regulation as the tier of service regularly provided to all subscribers that
includes, inter alia, any PEG channels required by local franchising authorities); Amend-
ment to Part 76 of Rules, [Current Service] Rad. Reg. (P & F) 85:5 at 85:607 (June 18,
1986).
Moreover, in the past some cable operators previewed and censored access program-
ming. See Cable TV Access Channel Rules, 83 F.C.C.2d 147 (1980) (amendments to
rules); Obscene or Indecent Matter on Access Channels, 59 F.C.C.2d 984 (1976) (cable
operator must not only make rules against obscene and indecent programming, but must
enforce them). Manhattan Cable, for example, required such a preview and reserved the
right not to transmit the program unless edited, ostensibly to protect itself from legal
liability. See C. Ferris, F. Lloyd, & T. Casey, supra note 168, at App. C-455 (excerpts
from Manhattan Cable TV Community Programming Handbook). But see Hofbauer,
supra note 16, at 198-99 (noting that New York law protects cable operator from liability
for programming it does not originate and suggesting other reasons for Manhattan
Cable's censorship). Cable operators now are precluded from exercising editorial control
over access programming and correspondingly are relieved from liability for it. Thus,
whatever moderating influence such a previewing process had is lost. See C. Ferris, F.
Lloyd, & T. Casey, supra note 168, 15.07[l].
293. For example, forty per cent of the movies on HBO are "R"-rated. See Smith,
Battle Intensifying Over Explicit Sex on Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
Most efforts to regulate cable indecency unavoidably affect numerous critically acclaimed
movies with "R" or even softer ratings. See supra note 239; see also Brief for Appellee
Home Box Office, Inc. at 9, Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-5588).
The situation may well be different with pay-per-view services on cable or subscription
television where a particular program is ordered from a program guide and paid for sepa-
rately. See Ross, Pay-Per- View on The Verge of Prominence, Cablevision, Nov. 4, 1985, at
24; Stevenson, A Push for Pay-Per- View TV, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1985, at Dl, col. 3.
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nudity, or violence.2 94 Program guides, however, are also available for
broadcast television. Moreover, they are not inherently more useful or
effective for cable subscribers than for broadcast viewers. Similarly,
equivalent warnings can be given to both cable and broadcast viewers,
both before and during2 95 potentially offensive programs.
The ultimate control for the cable subscriber is often said to be the
cable lock-box or parental discretion unit ("PDU"). This allows parents
to lock out, with a key or private code, particular channels likely to con-
tain material they do not want their children to see. The device, required
by the 1984 Cable Act,2 96 allows parents, even when they are absent, to
supervise their children. The PDU, however, is no panacea. Its effec-
tiveness depends on the quality and availability of advance information
from program guides. Moreover, even when the devices are advertised to
subscribers and readily available at nominal cost, very few subscribers
choose to use them. Apparently the need or desire for such control is
greatly exaggerated.297
To the extent a PDU is useful, however, it can benefit equally cable
and broadcasting. Some major television manufacturers already build
into certain models timing circuitry by which a parent can block out
designated channels, including those for playback of recorded material,
for up to 12 hours.298 More refined control can be provided by a device
that responds to a special electronic signal broadcast, for example, with
an "R" or "X"-rated movie. This signal could then turn the screen and
294. Many cable operators offer subscribers a programming guide, often without
charge. See Guides Gaining Ground, But Questions Remain, Cablevision, Jan. 6, 1986, at
35. National publications such as TV Guide provide the same sort of information on a
broader scale. These sources, moreover, merely supplement the cable and broadcasting
guides readily available in daily and Sunday newspapers. Some guides, however, may not
adequately cover public and leased access programming.
295. In 1975, for example, the FCC noted that, in France, broadcasters placed a small
white dot in a corner of the screen during a program to continually warn viewers that it
might not be suitable for children. See Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Ma-
terial, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 421 (1975). One commentator has suggested that requiring such
a warning would be constitutional as a sort of truth in labeling law. See Nadel, Cable-
speech for Whom?, 4 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 51, 57 (1985).
296. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
297. In Community Television, Inc., v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D. Utah
1985), affid sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), afl'd mem., 55
U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1987) (No. 86-1125), the Utah Attorney General com-
plained that, although cable subscribers were advised of the availability of lock-boxes
either free or for less than $20, less than one per cent of plaintiffs' subscribers chose to
obtain them. See Jones, 800 F.2d at 1002-03; Defendants' Amended Memorandum on
Summary Judgment at 21 nn.8 & 9, Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986);
Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum on Summary Judgment, at 10, Jones v. Wilkinson, 800
F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Smith, Battle Intensifying Over Explicit Sex on Cable
TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 2, at C22, col. 5 (in one California community,
only 300 families out of 96,000 subscribers, of whom 10,000 took a special adult subscrip-
tion service, obtained a free lock-box).
298. See, e.g., General Electric, Inc., (brochure describing Command Perform-
ance(TM) Series television sets) Pub. No. 76-4036, (available from G.E.'s Video Products
Business Division, Portsmouth, VA 23705).
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audio blank, scramble it, or switch to a "barker" channel, such as news,
public service or the like. Such broadcast technology is entirely feasible,
easily available, and relatively inexpensive.299 Indeed, virtually identical
technology already is used in teletext services."° These devices, how-
ever, have not become widely available3"' because manufacturers are
hesitant to make PDU's that respond to broadcast signals that are not
299. The triggering signal would be transmitted on the vertical blanking interval (VBI)
of a television broadcast signal. This is the space on a television screen appearing as a
black bar when a television picture rolls. It is used already to transmit information such
as teletext and close-captioned service, but still can accomodate the additional necessary
signals. See Data Transmission Services on the Vertical Blanking Interval, 57 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 832 (1985) (amendment to rules). Networks would not have a problem send-
ing the appropriate signals to their local affiliates because they already send similar sig-
nals to indicate when local programming should be inserted. Several knowledgeable
industry representatives have confirmed the ease of implementing such a process. See
Telephone interviews with: Ric Rowland, Product Manager, Subscriber Products of
Magnavox CATV (Oct. 23, 1985) (notes on file with author); Jim Farmer, Division Tech-
nical Manager, Broadband Communications Division of Scientific-Atlanta (Oct. 25, 1985)
(notes on file with author); Tom Mock, Staff Engineer, Electronic Industry Association
(Oct. 14, 1985) (notes on fie with author); Bob Woodward, Engineer and Coordinator of
Special Projects, Station KAET-TV, Tempe, Arizona (Oct. 17, 1985) (notes on file with
author); see also L.A. Times, June 21, 1983, Part VI, at 8, col. I. Action for Children's
Television relied on such technology in a recent petition asking the FCC to require the
broadcast of signals allowing home devices to block out commercials on children's televi-
sion. See Children's Advertising Detector Signal, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 935, 937-38
(1985) (petition for rule-making denied as inadvisable on policy grounds).
The industry representatives contacted indicated that the cost of such a PDU would
depend on whether the device were an out-of-set unit needing its own tuner or one built
into the television receiver's circuitry. Although a separate unit might cost a few hun-
dred dollars, all the estimates for the in-set unit were between S20 and S25. See W. Baer,
Controlling Unwanted Communications to the Home, Rand Paper P-6107, at 18 (1978)
(estimating the cost of built-in device responsive to transmitted signals at less than S25 if
produced in "large" quantities). The ultimate price would depend on the demand for the
product. Nevertheless, the cost could be subsidized, for example, by purchasers of all
television sets just as all subscribers of a cable system subsidize "free" lock-boxes.
An alternative system, the practicality and cost of which are unkown, has recently been
patented. It would employ a central monitoring and command station that would contin-
ually edit what could be watched on a television according to prior instructions from a
subscribing viewer. See Broadcasting, June 24, 1985, at 64.
300. See Transmission of Teletext by TV Stations, Report and Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1309 (1983) (amendment to rules), reconsid denied, 101 F.C.C.2d 827 (1985),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801
F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), petition for cerL filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1987)
(No. 86-1370); cf TV Toys: Debut and Debate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, at D3 col. I
(advent of interactive video toys that will respond to signals broadcast along with chil-
dren's television programs).
301. In a footnote in its Supreme Court brief, Pacifica cited an announcement, see
Technical Brief- Do-It-Yourself, Broadcasting, Feb. 27, 1978, at 83, of a prototype televi-
sion timing device to counter the argument of unsupervised exposure of children to
broadcast indecency. Brief for Appellee at 48-49 n.40, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978). The Court ignored the point, perhaps because the device was not fully devel-
oped or radio was the medium in issue. Indeed, one irony of the comparison between
cable and broadcast television is that radio may be distinguished from both of them.
Radio may be pervasive because its blare often is unavoidable in public places. It is
inexpensive and accessible to unsupervised children in a way that television is not. But
see Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1986, at 33 col. 4, describing the advent of mini portable televi-
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yet being transmitted. 30 2 The networks, in turn, do not have an incentive
to promote a system that, they fear, might curtail some of their audi-
ence.30 3 Moreover, in the current regulated environment, broadcast pro-
gramming generally has been too bland and noncontroversial to generate
much interest in PDU's.
The feasibility of broadcasting PDU's, functionally equivalent to cable
lock-boxes, thus destroys the Pacifica Court's already misplaced reliance
on Rowan.3°  These devices provide an individually discriminating
mechanism for excluding unwanted broadcast communications from the
home. They would be no more burdensome than the "short, though reg-
ular, journey from mailbox to trash can" that the Court accepted as an
alternative to government censorship in the context of objectionable
mailings.30 5 Moreover, the simple and practical development of the
broadcasting PDU is clearly a less restrictive means of regulation than
the Pacifica approach.30 6 Consequently, broader regulation is not justi-
fied simply because the alternative requires new but available methods.30 7
Rather, the availability of equivalent technology for broadcasting and
cable 30 1 should preclude different first amendment treatment for the two
media based, even in part, on the fallacious assumption of greater viewer
control over cable.
sions. On the other hand, radio is limited to language, which may be of less concern with
regard to indecency than graphic visual images.
302. See L.A. Times, June 21, 1983, Part VI, at 8, col. 1.
303. Such opposition might be short-sighted, however, since the availability of PDU's
might easily enable the networks to offer broader programming in competition with
cable.
304. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
305. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Lamont v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 800 F.2d
989, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
306. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984); see
also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981); Village of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980).
307. Indeed, the Second Circuit recently rejected the FCC's efforts to regulate dial-a-
porn through time-channeling or access code provisions because, with such content based
regulation, the Commission had failed adequately to consider less restrictive means that
are technically and economically feasible, such as new ways of selectively screening or
blocking such calls especially at customer premises. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 855-57 (2d Cir. 1986); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749
F.2d 113, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1984). In addition, the FCC has just made the "A/B" switch,
allowing television viewers to alternate between receiving cable and broadcast signals, a
centerpiece of its new must-carry rules. In doing so, the Commission acknowledged that
its previous concerns about the inconvenience of such switches and their non-use by con-
sumers were no longer valid in the search for regulatory approaches that are minimally
intrusive on first amendment freedoms. See Must Carry Rules, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
792, 841 (1986), modified on reconsid., 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) - (1987).
308. Use of the cable lock-box, which is totally controlled by the viewer, presents no
first amendment difficulties. Likewise, the simple timing PDU for broadcasting also
should be uncontroversial. With the signal-responsive PDU, however, it would be diffi-
cult to determine who should decide which programming should carry which triggering
signal and how that decision should be made. Within technical limitations, signals and
the programmed responses might differ with the degree of explicit sexual material or
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In fact, consideration of the technological comparability of broadcast-
ing and cable highlights that both media present similar challenges. The
real issue is the supervision and control that adults exercise over the tele-
vision viewing habits in their homes. Fundamentally, it is irrelevant
whether they exert control by pulling the plug, using lock-box devices, or
simply asserting appropriate authority.
B. The "Unique" Characteristics of Broadcasting: Pervasiveness and
Accessibility to Children
The asserted distinctions between cable and broadcasting also collapse
when measured by the purported "unique" characteristics of broadcast-
ing-pervasiveness and accesibility to children-that largely formed the
basis of Pacifica.
1. Pervasiveness
Whatever the Court meant by the "pervasiveness" of broadcasting,30 9
cable is similarly pervasive in any reasonable sense of the term. Perva-
siveness cannot mean simply that the broadcast medium, the airwaves,
are all around us. Such an atavistic notion of an "ether" in which elec-
tromagnetic radiation travels a10 is wholly irrelevant to the question of
content control. 311 Broadcast transmissions propagate through the air
and cable transmissions through wire; but this distinction adds nothing
to the dispute over what sort of material should be so distributed or who
should decide the issue.
The Court probably reasoned that broadcasting is pervasive in that, at
least in the United States, it reaches a nearly universal audience.31 2 The
excessively violent programming. In addition, other categories might have to be ad-
dressed.
Any such system would unavoidably perpetuate the difficulties inherent in any content
rating system. These would be compounded by government involvement. It is worth not-
ing, however, that, in support of its petition in Children's Advertising Detector Signal, 57
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 935 (1985), Action for Children's Television submitted a short
memorandum by Professor Laurence Tribe concluding that there was no first amendment
obstacle to a signal responsive PDU to block out commercials on children's television.
Dealing with general programming, not just commercial speech specifically directed at
children that need not be rated, would be far more complex. Ultimately, however, the
system might be as manageable as the current MPAA movie rating system.
309. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). The Court offered no real
explanation of what it meant by the broadcast media's "uniquely pervasive presence."
310. The notion of a mystical, omnipresent ether as the medium through which elec-
tromagnetic radiation propagates was discredited as early as 1887 by the Michelson-Mor-
ley experiment. It was definitely refuted at the latest by Albert Einstein's 1905 paper on
the special theory of relativity. See Einstein- A Centenary Volume, 76-77, 82-83, 247-
50 (A.P. French ed. 1979). It was not until 1982, however, that Congress replaced
"ether" with "electromagnetic spectrum" in the Communications Act. See Pub. L. No.
97-259, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 1099 (1982) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 304).
311. But see Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp 1164, 1169 (D.
Utah 1982) (invoking the ether concept).
312. There are more than 86 million television households in the United States, repre-
senting 98% of all households, and an estimated 489 million radio sets 55% of which are
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vast majority of this country's population is exposed to a significant
amount of television in their daily lives. 313 Cable television, however,
while not yet as universal as its broadcast counterpart, reaches an in-
creasingly substantial portion of the American public.314 Estimates for
1990 are that 54% of television households will have at least basic cable
and 35% will have pay cable as well. Further, about 87% of all televi-
sion households will be passed by cable and, therefore, have it avail-
able.315 The question is not whether cable is as universal as broadcasting,
but whether access to cable is so limited that it can be considered a
nonpervasive medium. The available current and projected statistics
clearly indicate that, on any sensible scale of pervasiveness, the answer is
no.3 16 Thus, cable and broadcasting cannot be distinguished because one
is quantitatively pervasive and the other is not.
The Court apparently also emphasized that broadcasting is available in
the home.3 17 This, of course, is equally true of cable and most other
media of mass communication, including movies on videocassettes. But
classifying broadcasting as an "invader" into the home and cable as only
an "invited guest" is inappropriate.31 8 Moreover, because both broad-
casting and cable come into the home where one's privacy interest is
greatest, both media should be free from government intervention. A
similar privacy concern also supports individual freedom of choice,
either to refrain from watching objectionable programming or to allow
into one's home, under appropriate supervision, programs one desires,
even though others find them offensive. Because such freedom of choice
can be exercised equally in either medium, pervasiveness neither distin-
guishes cable from broadcasting nor supports government censorship.
in the home. Broadcasting Publications, Inc., Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook A-2
(1986).
313. The average daily viewing in television households, during the 1983-84 season,
was over seven hours. A.C. Nielsen & Co., supra note 206, at 6. Even the lowest viewing
household group spends more time watching television each week - over 40 hours -
than most people spend working. See id. at 7.
314. Over 7,300 cable systems nationwide serve some 19,000 communities. Broadcast-
ing Publications, Inc., supra note 312, at D-3. Another one-thousand franchises have
been approved but not yet built. Id. In 1985 cable had penetrated over 46% (39.9 mil-
lion) of all television households in this country, a yearly increase of 5.7%, Broadcasting,
Dec. 16, 1985, at 144 (citing statistics from A.C. Nielsen & Co.). As of 1987, almost 75%
of television households were passed by cable. Cablevision, Jan. 5, 1987, at 62.
315. Id. Some analysts predict 60% cable penetration (58 million subscribers) by
1990. See 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 4, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 209 n.242
(1985); Arthur D. Little, Inc., Prosperity for Cable TV: Outlook 1985-1990 at 11 (1985)
(Report to National Cable Television Association projecting cable industry growth).
316. Cable and broadcasting cannot be distinguished on the basis that broadcast televi-
sion is thought to be free while cable might be considered expensive and, therefore, of
limited availability. See Winer, supra note 3, at 252-54.
317. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). See supra notes 217-25
and accompanying text.
318. Any such purported distinction collapses even further to the extent cable is used
for the reception of broadcast signals otherwise unavailable (e.g., distant signals imported
from broadcast "superstations") or of inadequate quality.
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2. "The Children, The Children, I'll Not Forget the Children"'319
Children are different, and this basic fact is reflected throughout the
law.320 The Court's rulings in Ferber and Ginsberg bear this out. And
there is a plausible rationale for treating children somewhat differently
under the first amendment. Freedom of expression is meaningful only to
the extent that both speaker and listener can appreciably understand and
evaluate the expression and make choices regarding it. Children may be
deemed to lack the full capacity to understand certain kinds of expres-
sion such as racial propaganda or sexually explicit material. As a result,
one could argue that some restrictions on the unsupervised communica-
tion of such material specifically directed at children entail no significant
infringement on freedom of expression either of the children as listeners
or of others as speakers.321
On the other hand, the Court consistently has maintained that it is
improper to reduce the adult population to reading and viewing only
what is appropriate for children, so as to protect children from sexually
provocative material.322 Solicitude for children, then, justifies neither the
regulation of indecency on television nor different regulation for broad-
casting and cable. Such regulation inevitably abridges adults' first
amendment rights, improperly usurps a discretionary parental function
with broad governmental fiat, and ignores less restrictive means to pro-
tect children equally available in broadcasting and cable.
Completely banning indecency on cable eliminates protected commu-
nication. Restricting indecency to late evening and early morning hours,
when most people are asleep, also substantially intrudes on the rights of
both programmers and viewers by effectively precluding protected ex-
pression.323 Governmental regulation cannot single out the youthful
319. R. Rodgers & 0. Hammerstein, The King and I (1951).
320. The standard law school core curriculum illustrates this. See eg., New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338-40 (1985) (constitutional law) (school officials do not need a
warrant to search a student); Camerlinck v. Thomas, 209 Neb. 843, 851, 312 N.W.2d
260, 264 (1981) (torts) (child held to standard of conduct only of reasonable person of
like age, intelligence and experience under the circumstances); Sisneros v. Garcia, 94
N.M. 552, 553, 613 P.2d 422, 423 (1980) (property) (minor's conveyance of land subject
to disaffirmance within a reasonable time after minor reaches majority); Halbman v.
Lemke, 99 Wis. 2d 241, 245, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564-65 (1980) (contracts) (a minor's con-
tract for non-necessity item is void or voidable at his option); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (c)
(1982) (procedure) (child may lack capacity to sue without a representative); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-501 (1985) (criminal law) (age of responsibility statute).
321. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring);
see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757-58 (1978) (Powell, Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring) (children do not have "full capacity for individual choice which is the pre-
supposition of First Amendment guarantees"); id at 768 n.3 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (children may be incapable of evaluating the content of certain
communication).
322. See supra note 216.
323. See A.C. Nielsen Co., supra note 206, at 8 (showing the dramatic decline in televi-
sion viewing after 10 P.M.). Such alleged "time, place and manner" regulations must fail
because they not only channel expression but, in fact, curtail it. Moreover, they improp-
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portion of the viewing audience without impermissibly encroaching on
the constitutional rights of adults.324
In the home, however, parents can more precisely control what their
children watch and appropriately balance the rights of adults and the
interests of children. Parents are best able to make individualized dis-
criminating judgments concerning household viewing habits, not only
with regard to sexual material but also as to excessive or graphic violence
or other matters of individual sensibilities. The Supreme Court long has
largely deferred to a parent's right to control the development and up-
bringing of his children.325 Thus, regulations that would exclude or limit
constitutionally protected programming for adults cannot be justified on
the basis of what parents choose to do or fail to do.
Parental authority, then, is the proper control over what children
watch on television. There is, therefore, no basis for distinguishing be-
tween cable and broadcasting for indecency regulation because that au-
thority can be exercised equally well with either medium. This is obvious
when direct adult supervision is possible. When children are un-
erly are based on content. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F.
Supp. 1099, 1100, 1116-17 (D. Utah 1985), affid sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d
989 (10th Cir. 1986) affd men., 55 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1987) (No. 86-1125);
see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515-517 (1981) (ordinance
banning certain billboard signs is not a time, place, and manner restriction because it is
based on content); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980) (holding unconstitutional a prohibition of utility bill inserts that discuss issues of
public importance because based on content); cf Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 84-86 (1976) (Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting)
(first amendment prohibits content-based zoning restrictions on theaters that exhibit non-
obscene, but sexually oriented, films). But see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986) (zoning restrictions on adult theaters were aimed at secondary
effects of the theaters on the surrounding community, not at content of films).
324. All portions of the viewing day contain a significant children's audience. For
example, for all children, the smallest identifiable viewing period is Monday through Sun-
day, 11 P.M. to I A.M. Even so, this period comprises 1% of all television viewing for
children aged 2-5, 2% for children aged 6-11, 6% for male teenagers, and 5% for female
teenagers. A.C. Nielsen Co., supra note 206, at 8-9. For a description of similar statistics
available to the FCC at the time of Pacifica, see Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 19
n.2 (1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Time channeling of indecency, therefore, can sub-
stantially burden adult viewers but cannot effectively exclude children from the audience.
Distribution of cable programming is thus very different from movie theaters, magazines,
or videocassette sales, which permit some screening of customers. This is why Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), which dealt with direct sale of "so-called 'girlie'
magazines" to minors, is not applicable in the cable context. See id. at 631. See supra
note 88.
325. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (parents may remove
children from public school if continued attendance would substantially infringe on legiti-
mate religious beliefs); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("The prohibi-
tion against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the
magazines for their children."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)
(state may not unreasonably interfere with the right of parents to direct their children's
upbringing and education); see also Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726, 769-70 (1978)
(Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (the Court "has consistently been vigilant" in pro-
tecting the "time-honored right of a parent to raise his child as he sees fit").
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supervised, program guides and the electronic technology available for
both cable and broadcasting can provide the desired control. Indeed, the
availability of a simple lock to prevent all unsupervised television watch-
ing, even without more refined technology, should be an adequate, less
restrictive means of control sufficient to preclude any broader govern-
ment regulation.
C. Societal Justifications for Controlling Indecent Programming
Societal justifications for controlling indecent programming on broad-
cast or cable television depend on two concerns: a respect for individual
tastes and sensibilities, and the harm to society that allegedly flows from
the wide availability of indecent material. Neither of these provides a
basis for differential treatment of cable and broadcasting. Further, they
are insufficient to override the substantial first amendment interests of
programmers and willing viewers.
1. Individual Tastes and Sensibilities
No viewer is a captive audience of either cable or broadcasting; he can
avoid or turn away from either with equal ease. The concern for individ-
ual sensibilities is thus limited to the momentary affront an unwilling
viewer may suffer when accosted by offensive material in turning on the
set or scanning the dial.
Again there is no significant difference between the media. The large
number of channels and diverse programming available on cable may
increase the potential incidents of momentary offense. Cable's narrow-
casting feature, however, makes it easier to identify which channels are
most likely to give offense, and thus to be excluded altogether, avoided,
or electronically screened.326 Moreover, the various prophylactic meas-
ures such as program guides, prior or simultaneous warnings and elec-
tronic screening are available for either medium.
It is therefore better to preserve first amendment freedoms, even at the
expense of some brief incidents of offense to sensitive individuals. Such
incidents, after all, are the stuff of daily life that individuals must learn to
tolerate. 327 That they occur in the home does not alter this conclusion.
By choosing to watch either cable or broadcasting and by ignoring avail-
able prophylactic measures, an individual consents to enter into public
discourse and must accept the rough edges of that process. A contrary
approach would be inimical to first amendment dictates and values.
Taste and sensibilities are highly individualistic; sexually graphic mate-
rial offends one person, violence a second, hard rock movie videos a
third, and scenes of starving children in Ethiopia a fourth.328 Once we
326. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
327. See Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
328. Al Goldstein, publisher of Screw magazine, powerfully criticizes the arguably
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begin cleansing the television screen of all that is even momentarily ob-
jectionable to a myriad of living room viewers, there is no end in sight.
The first amendment is thus hopelessly eroded and the result is a worth-
less medium.
2. Harm to Society
Concern for individual tastes and sensibilities is based on direct, imme-
diate, and specific harm to a given individual. Concern for harm to soci-
ety from a debasement of morals, values and attitudes is, by contrast,
vague, general and indefinite and relates only indirectly to harm to any
given individual. Centuries of debate have dealt with the evil effects and
possible benefits of obscenity.32 9 Decades of debate have dealt with the
effects of television programming, especially violence, on viewers in gen-
eral and children in particular.33 °
strange values that bar sexually explicit material from the television screen while not
restricting brutal scenes of graphic violence, often directed at young women, that is the
standard fare of many television movies. Goldstein produces Midnight Blues, a late-night
sex show aired on Manhattan Cable's public access channel in New York City. He has
editorialized on this program by juxtaposing scenes from Midnight Blues censored by
Manhattan Cable, such as a woman masturbating and two nude women making love,
with scenes from movies such as Friday the Thirteenth and Halloween. Goldstein notes
that Home Box Office, Inc., the owner of Manhattan Cable, has no compunction about
showing such movies on prime time, even though they include deliberately gory scenes of
vulnerable young women being terrified and brutalized by stabbings, strangulations,
slashed throats, decapitations, heads split open by hatchets, and violent rape. Goldstein
questions the ethics of showing such movies on Home Box Office, which proclaims that
while it airs "R"-rated movies it will not allow "X"-rated ones, while censoring totally
nonviolent but sexually explicit material. In Goldstein's more colorful language, blood
not sperm is acceptable; penetration with a meat cleaver but not a male sex organ; a
breast can be shown only if there is a knife in it. See excerpts from Midnight Blues, (show
No. 404, Mar. 26, 30, 1984) (videocassette on file with the author); see also Goldstein,
Cable TV's Shame: "Gore-nography", N.Y. Times, July 3, 1984, at A15, col. 5.
329. See generally F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 178-88 (1982). It
remains true, however, that "[t]he Supreme Court has never definitively explained thejustification for regulation of obscenity." Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 22 n.14
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See M. Redish,
Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis 68-76 (1984).
330. See generally W. Rowland, The Politics of TV Violence (1983); Krattenmaker &
Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 Va.
L. Rev. 1123 (1978); Prettyman & Hook, The Control of Media-Related Imitative Vio-
lence, 38 Fed. Comm. L.J. 317 (1987). Nevertheless, for an argument that the "extensive,
avid, and seemingly decisive" body of research on the effects of watching television "is
one of the grandest travesties in the uneven history of social science" akin to the 19th
century "science" of craniology, see Fowles, The "Craniology" of the 20th Century: Re-
search on Television's Effects, Television Quarterly, Summer 1984, at 61.
Regardless of the merits of social science research about television, the legal standard
should be clear: Any generalized ill effects asserted to result from television program-
ming must be compellingly demonstrated before first amendment rights can be overrid-
den. Indeed, such a rigorous standard has been applied in far more particularized
circumstances. See, e.g., Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 203-
07 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (cause of action by minor, claiming that television networks' pro-
gramming stimulated him to duplicate acts of violence, barred by first amendment);
Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 492-95, 178 Cal. Rptr.
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With regard to indecency on television, however, there is a simple ap-
proach. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment, in
its evolving concept of unprotected obscenity, delimits what expression
can be curtailed. Material that does not sink to the level of obscenity is
deemed not to pose a sufficient threat to society or its morals to justify
regulation. If Playboy magazine cannot be excluded from newsracks or
subscribers' mailboxes, there is no reason to regulate The Playboy Chan-
nel either on cable or broadcast television.
It is highly dubious that similar indecent material is potentially more
damaging on a television screen than between the covers of a book or
magazine.332 Although material on a television screen is more "alive"
and thus has a greater sensory impact, this impact is lessened by the
passivity of television watching, which does not require the same pur-
poseful mental involvement that reading or viewing printed matter re-
quires. Television viewing is also a more public activity than reading
books or magazines and, therefore, subject to more constraints on its use,
888, 891-93 (1982) (tort action against network by young girl, artificially raped by
juveniles acting upon stimulus of network television drama, dismissed because plaintiff
could not show stimulus amounted to incitement required by the first amendment); Walt
Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 404-06, 276 S.E.2d 580, 582-83 (1981)
(action by child, injured while mimicking trick on children's television program, barred
by first amendment because it did not create a "clear and present danger" of such injury);
DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 104041 (R.I. 1982) (first
amendment bars wrongful death action against network by parents of boy who acciden-
tally hanged himself while imitating stunt seen on network program because broadcast
could not be construed as incitement). But see Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal.3d 40,
46-48, 539 P.2d 36, 39-40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471-72 (1975) (radio station may be liable
for automobile accident caused by negligence of participants in station's contest to locate
roving disc jockey).
331. One might recoil at the thought of, say, CBS transforming itself into another
Playboy Channel. This, of course, is not likely to happen. Too many countervailing com-
mercial, institutional, and societal pressures exist. Indeed, witness the networks' great
reluctance to accept condom advertisements despite the many "respectable" advocates
for it. See Congress Considers Condom Commercials, Broadcasting, Feb. 16, 1987, at 65 ;
cf. More Stations Accepting Condom Spots, Broadcasting, Feb. 23, 1987, at 41. What
might happen, however, is that, for example, mainstream movies will be shown on televi-
sion without the infamous and disheartening legend "Edited for Television," which al-
ways implies that someone at the network knows better than the viewer what he or she
should watch. The teaching of the first amendment is that, unless the television medium,
both cable and broadcasting, is as free as the print media to be both bad and good, it will
remain an inferior medium. Should Time magazine decide to become another Playboy,
that might raise some journalistic concerns. It would not, however, be a proper govern-
mental concern. The same should be true for television.
332. The notion that the special psychological impact of television might justify certain
regulation owes its judicial origins to Judge Bazelon's comments in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969), which upheld
FCC regulation of cigarette commercials. See id at 1002; see also Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 128 (1973) (broadcast advertising is
more problematic than print because it cannot be as easily ignored). But Judge Bazelon
substantially reconsidered his position in a later article, and disavowed the theory's appli-
cability in the indecency context. See Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunica-
tions Press, 1975 Duke L.J. 213, 222 (1975); see also Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9,
26 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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in particular greater parental control. The television set cannot easily be
kept under a mattress and quietly watched behind a garage. Books and
magazines, however, are more easily obtained, more permanent, avail-
able at all hours, and more susceptible to private use. In short, they are
more "pervasive" and, therefore, harder to control. Printed material also
lends itself to episodic use while television requires more sustained
watching, thereby placing any objectionable portions into whatever re-
deeming context the program offers.
Moreover, the supposed power of television, whether derived from its
special psychological or persuasive impact,333 or simply from the vast
audience it reaches, does not justify increased government control. In-
deed, such a rationale would invert traditional first amendment theories
because the greater exposure or communicative impact a medium has the
more it needs, and probably deserves, first amendment protection. 334
Thus, when the FCC recently argued that broadcasting has particular
power and immediacy that justifies its different first amendment treat-
ment, a panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, including
Judge, now Justice, Scalia, responded: "Whether or not that is true, we
are unwilling to endorse an argument that makes the very effectiveness of
speech the justification for according it less first amendment
protection. '
335
In sum, concern for harm to society from the proliferation of indecent
material should not distinguish the medium of home television. But even
if the nature of this medium is considered important on the basis of an
333. A recent study shows that the public prefers television to newspapers as a source
of reliable news, but they generally were ranked about equal as to their credibility, accu-
racy, and completeness. See MORI Research, Inc., Newspaper Credibility: Building
Reader Trust, 13, 20, 40-43 (1985) (national study commissioned by The American Soci-
ety of Newspaper Editors).
334. Chief Justice Earl Warren made this point eloquently in dissenting from a deci-
sion that upheld a prior review statute for motion pictures:
[E]ven if the impact of the motion picture is greater than that of some other
media, that fact constitutes no basis for the argument that motion pictures
should be subject to greater suppression. This is the traditional argument made
in the censor's behalf; this is the argument advanced against newspapers at the
time of the invention of the printing press. The argument was ultimately re-
jected in England, and has consistently been held to be contrary to our Consti-
tution. No compelling reason has been predicated for accepting the contention
now.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 77 (1961) (Warren, C.J., Black, Doug-
las, Brennan, JJ., dissenting); see also American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985) (the assumed power of pornography to affect attitudes and per-
petuate subordination of women is no basis for its regulation), aff'd mem., 106 S. Ct. 1172
(1986); Freedom of Expression Act of 1983, Hearings on S. 1917 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 80 (1984)
(statement of Floyd Abrams, attorney) ("The Government should, at the very least, be no
more empowered to regulate the means of communication with the most impact on the
public than to regulate other modes of communication.").
335. Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (determining which political broadcast regulations apply to teletext), petition
for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1987) (No. 86-1370).
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assumed difference in impact, the impact of cable and broadcasting is the
same. Again, there is no reason to treat the two differently.
V. CONCLUSION
In an earlier Article, I argued that cable and broadcast television
should be considered a single, unified medium, thereby maximizing the
first amendment protection each should enjoy. In fact, the cable and
broadcast media thus become constitutionally indistinguishable from the
print media. Indeed, I showed that differentiating cable and broadcast-
ing perpetuates problematic government restrictions on each across a
range of regulations including economic controls, the fairness doctrine,
access provisions, and children's programming.
3 36
The cable indecency cases present a problem in this regard. Although
so far they have reached the right result of no censorship, these cases
unconvincingly assert that cable is fundamentally different from broad-
casting. Such arguments are unsupportable and inimical to the pre-
ferred, unified approach. To say that one of the two media is pervasive in
a meaningful way and that the other is not, or that one is an intruder into
the home while the other is an invited guest, or that one is accessible to a
substantial and important segment of viewers--children-to whom the
other is restricted, contradicts the fundamental notions of their similar-
ity, substitutability, and competitive relationship simply to avoid inde-
cency controls that are more fatally flawed in their own right.
336. The children's programming issue concerns the availability of an adequate
amount of age-specific programming for children. This is particularly relevant here be-
cause one focus in the indecency area is to distinguish cable from broadcasting based on
children's comparatively limited access to cable. Yet the FCC relied on cable to supple-
ment children's broadcast programming in deciding not to mandate the amount of chil-
dren's programming broadcasters must provide. In doing so, the FCC included some
programming directed at children on pay cable services, such as Home Box Office, the
same service that has figured prominently in most of the cable indecency cases. The
conflicting arguments, therefore, consider Home Box Office both accessible and inaccessi-
ble to children. See Advertisng & Programming on Children's Television, 96 F.C.C.2d
634, 646 (1984) (rep. & ord.). See generally Winer, supra note 3, at 278-82.
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